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This document examines the time-series properties of the wage di⁄erentials
that arise between the public and private sector in Colombia during the sample
period 1984 to 2005. We ￿nd con￿ icting results in unit-root and stationarity
tests when looking at wage di⁄erentials at an aggregate level (such as for
men, women or both). However, when we analyse wage di⁄erentials at higher
levels of disaggregation, treat them jointly as a panel of data, and allow for
the presence of potential cross section dependence, there is more supportive
evidence for the view that wage di⁄erentials are stationary. This implies that
although wage di⁄erentials do exist, they have not been consistently increasing
(or decreasing) over time.
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Historically, the role and the size of the public sector have been topics of consider-
able debate among economists. In this debate, both employment and remuneration
in public sector labour markets have usually been at the core of the discussion.
Clearly, these two issues are of importance because of their economic and social
policy dimensions, as wages constitute the main source of income for a large number
of individuals and their families. In addition, wages serve as the mechanism that
guides not only an individual￿ s work-leisure decision problem, but also his/her choice
of where to work.
It is well known that economic theory establishes that wages are positively re-
lated to labour productivity. However, when it comes to the public sector the
question of how wages and employment are determined is not easy to answer. As
indicated by Gregory and Borland (1999), while in the private sector employment
and earnings are determined within a market environment, in the public sector
the same decision-making process takes place within a political environment, where
politicians and bureaucrats may well have objective functions that di⁄er from those
utilise by the owners of ￿rms in the private sector. Thus, for example, a politi-
cian￿ s objective function may well be one of vote-maximisation, or alternatively one
of budget-maximisation. In addition to this, the e⁄ects of unions and collective
bargaining are more likely to be observed in public sector labour markets than in
private ones.
The purpose of this document is to study the relationship between wages in
the public and private sector in Colombia. During the last two decades or so,
Colombia has become an interesting case-study that features high and persistent
unemployment, low rates of job creation in the formal private sector, and the growing
importance of an informal private sector that is characterised by new contractual
forms in the labour market.1 These new contractual forms include the creation of
1Lora and MÆrquez (1998) present some stylised facts of employment in Colombia as well as in
other Latin American economies see . For a formal econometric analysis of the labour market in
Colombia see e.g. Arango and Posada (2002).
1companies whose main objective is to act as intermediaries between workers and
￿rms, where the latter aim to minimise the payroll taxes associated to the formal
sector, which include social security payments and pension contributions, among
others. As a result, jobs in the public sector become more attractive due to the fact
that it is more di¢ cult for employers to avoid the payment of these additional costs
to their employees.
International literature on the evolution of wages in the public and private sectors
and the corresponding di⁄erential that arises between them is extensive; see, inter
alia, Pederson, Schmidt-Słrensen, Smith, and Westerg￿rd-Nielsen (1990), Hundley
(1991), Mueller (1998), Tansel (1998), Adamchik and Bedi (2000), Bender (2002),
Panizza and Qiang (2005) and Lamo, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008). Literature for
Colombia is more scarce. Two relatively recent exceptions are Arango and Posada
(2007), who present a descriptive analysis of the dynamic behaviour of public sec-
tor wages in several occupational categories, and Galvis (2010), who studies wage
disparities for private sector employees. Based on our literature review, it appears
that there are no other works for Colombia that analyse the behaviour of public and
private sector wages, both within each sector as well as between them.
The main objective of this document is to examine whether there is evidence
of a stable long-run equilibrium relationship between wages in the public and pri-
vate sector in Colombia. We believe that the study of the Colombian experience is
interesting because ever since 1886, the central government concentrated political,
administrative and ￿scal powers. Then, in 1991 a constitutional reform introduced
important modi￿cations and changes in the existing territorial order of the country,
so that regional and local levels of government were given greater power and respon-
sibilities, and a new set of parameters to assign and determine transfers from the
central government were de￿ned.2 Thus, it is of some interest to determine whether
this decentralisation process has led to increasing wage di⁄erentials between sec-
tors. Initially, this analysis can be undertaken at an aggregate level by comparing
2See e.g. Iregui (2005), for estimates of the welfare e⁄ects of decentralisation in Colombia.
2earnings in the private sector with those in the public sector. Then, one could fur-
ther analyse gender, city and occupational category di⁄erentials between public and
private sector employees.
This document o⁄ers three main contributions to existing literature. First, we
use data from Colombian household surveys collected over the period 1984 to 2005.
The advantage of this source of information is that it allows us to focus on how
individual-level data have changed over time for di⁄erent economic sectors, gender,
occupational category and city. The selection of the sample period is dictated by the
availability of a consistent dataset. This is because in 2006 signi￿cant methodological
changes were implemented in the household survey system, so that results before
and after this year are not directly comparable.
Second, we focus on an examination of the time series properties of wage di⁄eren-
tials or, put another way, we assess whether or not wage di⁄erentials are stationary.
In this sense, ￿nding that a wage di⁄erential is stationary is equivalent to saying
that the two wages are cointegrated with a known cointegrating vector equal to
[1;￿1]
0
. From an economic point of view, this means that wage levels maintain a
stable long-run equilibrium relationship, so that the corresponding wage di⁄erential
does not increase (or decrease) without bound as time passes. To the best of our
knowledge, this empirical modelling approach has not been implemented by other
authors.
Third, the time-series analysis will be undertaken by looking at each wage dif-
ferential individually as well as within a panel data framework. The advantage of
adopting a panel data setup is that it allows us to examine the potential e⁄ect of
cross-sectional dependence among wages that may arise from common shocks (or
innovations). Another advantage of panel data is that by combining information
from the time-series dimension with that from the cross-section dimension, fewer
time series observations are required for statistical tests to have power.
The document is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review
on wage di⁄erentials between the public and private sectors. Section 3 presents the
3methodology that will be used in the document. We start o⁄ by brie￿ y presenting
important time-series concepts that will be used in the document, along with their
economic implications. Then, we describe the statistical tests that will be applied to
assess the time-series properties of several wage di⁄erentials. Section 4 describes the
data that will be used in the document and shows some of the stylised facts about
the evolution of wages in Colombia. Section 5 examines the time-series properties
of wage di⁄erentials in the country. Section 6 o⁄ers concluding remarks.
2 Brief literature review
During the last three decades or so, a number of authors have analysed the dynamic
behaviour of public and private sector wages. The study of wage di⁄erentials between
the public and private sectors has been motivated, among other factors, by the
recent growth of the public sector in many countries around the world and the
corresponding cost-implications on tax-payers. There are two main reasons why
one should be interested in the operation of public sector labour markets. First,
public sector labour markets are large and their ￿nancial resources primarily come
from the functioning of the private sector. Second, public sector labour markets are
di⁄erent from private sector labour markets in as much as politicians or bureaucrats￿
objective function di⁄ers from that of the owners of private sector ￿rms. Indeed,
as indicated in the previous section, decision-making on public sector employment
and wages takes place in a political environment, where politicians and bureaucrats
may have objectives that not always seek pro￿tability. By contrast, private sector
decision-making occurs in a market environment in which owners (or shareholders)
of private sector ￿rms continuously monitor the performance of their companies.
Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986), Gregory and Borland (1999) and Bender (2002)
present comprehensive surveys of the literature concerning wage di⁄erentials be-
tween the public and private sectors. Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) focus mainly
on studies dealing with the United States, while the other two also include ref-
erences for other developed and developing countries. Bender (2002) reviews the
4literature that provides theoretical reasons that attempt to explain the existence of
public/private wage di⁄erentials. According to this author, there are several factors
that may be taken into consideration when examining possible explanations. First,
there is the in￿ uence of trade unions on demand for public sector goods and the
￿ vote producing￿activities by civil servants. Second, part of the public/private wage
di⁄erential may emerge from economic rents perceived by public sector workers be-
cause of their bargaining power in those services that are considered essential. Third,
the idea of a public/private wage di⁄erential has to be analysed carefully because of
the existence of selection bias and other econometric problems that may arise from
the available data. According to Bender (2002) a common ￿nding of the empirical
studies in his survey is the existence of a declining premium paid to central govern-
ment employees, although for developing countries wage di⁄erentials are found to be
negative in some instances. As will be shown below, there are di⁄erent ways to study
the existence of wage di⁄erentials between the public and private sectors. However,
an important factor that must be taken into account, in particular for the purposes
of international comparisons, is the size of the public sector in the economy, as it
re￿ ects the capacity of the sector to compete for workers in the labour market.
In their analysis of public sector labour markets, Gregory and Borland (1999) ￿nd
a persistent increase in the size of the public sector in several countries. According
to these authors, public sector workers get higher average earnings than private
sector ones due to di⁄erences in levels of education (which is higher for individuals
in the public sector). At the same time, these authors also ￿nd that the earnings
distribution of public sector workers exhibits is more concentrated around its mean
value compared to that of private sector workers. In addition, the union/non-union
and male/female wage gaps tend to be smaller in the public sector.
Turning to speci￿c country-case studies, most of the literature is related to devel-
oped and emerging market countries; see, for instance, Pederson, Schmidt-Słrensen,
Smith, and Westerg￿rd-Nielsen (1990) for Denmark, Hundley (1991) for the United
States, Alvarez, Jareæo, and Sebastian (1993) for Spain, Dustmann and Soest (1998)
5for Germany, Mueller (1998) for Canada, Tansel (1998) for Turkey, Adamchik and
Bedi (2000) for Poland, and Lamo, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008) for a sample of
OECD and Euro zone countries. Some of these studies have looked at the deter-
minants of wages, while others have examined the existence of wage di⁄erentials
between the public and private sectors.
Pederson, Schmidt-Słrensen, Smith, and Westerg￿rd-Nielsen (1990) examine the
public/private wage di⁄erential using Danish data from a panel of individuals over
the period 1976 to 1985. The results of estimating ￿xed-e⁄ect type regressions
show evidence that a wage-twist policy has been applied over the sample period.
The idea of a wage-twist policy is to implement a series of mechanisms to a⁄ect
the allocation of resources between the public and the private sector. Thus, for
example, a government may attempt to reduce the private/public wage di⁄erential
in order to overcome recruitment and retention problems for public sector employees.
An additional interesting ￿nding form their work is that "women employed in the
formal sector tend to have higher average skills than men employed in the formal
sector (...) probably due to supply and demand considerations" (p. 830). According
to these authors, if it is accepted that job security is important in the public sector,
then the public wage premium has to be analysed from a di⁄erent perspective, such
as the general equilibrium one considered by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Hundley (1991), using data from the 1985 Current Population Survey of the
United States, ￿nds that public/private wage di⁄erentials tend to decline as the
level of skill required to ful￿l an occupational category is increased. Mueller (1998)
uses quantile regression techniques to estimate the size of the public/private wage
di⁄erential in Canada. This author ￿nds that this di⁄erential tends to be highest for
women, federal government employees, and individuals at the lower tail of the wage
distribution. The use of quantile regressions is crucial to understand di⁄erences in
public/private wages over the whole distribution of wages and not only at the mean
of the distribution.
Dustmann and Soest (1998) analyse several statistical assumptions used in em-
6pirical models on public/private sector wage structures for Germany. They use
an extended version of a standard switching regression model that allows for en-
dogeneity in the level of education, experience, and hours worked. Several model
speci￿cations are estimated and the results of such models are subsequently com-
pared. It turns out that their results are sensitive to the identi￿cation assumptions
that are adopted, but robust to the regressors that are included in the model. Al-
varez, Jareæo, and Sebastian (1993) use Spanish data over the period 1964￿ 1991 to
analyse transmission mechanisms between prices and nominal wages. The results of
estimating a VAR model indicates that private sector wages help explain in￿ ation,
while public sector wages play a minor role. They also ￿nd that public sector wages
do not have an impact on private sector wages.
Adamchik and Bedi (2000) examine whether there are wage di⁄erentials between
workers in the public and the private sectors in Poland. After standardising for
worker characteristics and sector selection e⁄ects, they ￿nd evidence of a private
sector positive wage premium. This wage premium is particularly large for university
educated workers. According to the authors, the existence of these wage di⁄erentials
make it di¢ cult for the public sector to attract and retain skilled employees. In
addition, lower public sector wages may encourage moonlighting and compromise
the e¢ ciency of the public sector.
Lamo, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008) analyse the interaction between public and
private sector wages during 1960-2006 for a sample of OECD and Euro zone coun-
tries. They ￿nd empirical evidence that salaries are positively correlated over the
business cycle. Also, they uncover evidence of short-, medium- and long-run co-
movements between public and private sector salaries. Lastly, causality tests sug-
gest a predominant role of private salaries over the business cycle. Tansel (1998)
￿nds mixed results when analysis public/private wage di⁄erential in Turkey. In-
deed, after controlling for observed individual characteristics and sample selection
bias, this author ￿nds that wages for men (women) in public administration are
lower (greater) than wages for men (women) in the private sector. Moreover, wage
7di⁄erentials because of gender are not found for individuals working in the public
sector, although they are found to exist for workers in the private sector.
For Latin American countries, existing literature appears more scarce; see e.g.
Panizza and Qiang (2005) for a study of a sample of Latin American countries,
Stelcner, der Gaag, and Vijverberg (1989) for the case of Peru, and Arango and
Posada (2007) and Galvis (2010) for studies of the Colombian case. Panizza and
Qiang (2005) use household survey data for thirteen Latin American countries to
investigate wage di⁄erentials between the public and private sectors, as well as wage
di⁄erentials that may arise because of gender.3 These authors ￿nd that in the cases
of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and El Salvador, there is evidence of a
statistically and economically signi￿cant public wage premium that favours male
workers. Interestingly, in the cases of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras,
Mexico and El Salvador, they also uncover evidence of a wage premium for women
working in the public sector. Stelcner, der Gaag, and Vijverberg (1989) use Peruvian
data to study the emergence of wage di⁄erentials between male and female workers
in the public and private sectors. The authors estimate a switching regression model
and ￿nd that there is not a "pure" wage advantage or economic rent of government
workers when corrected estimates of wage functions are compared. Their ￿ndings
indicate that in Lima there is a wage di⁄erential in favour of private sector employees,
while in other urban areas there is no signi￿cant wage di⁄erential. In the case of
Colombia, the evolution of the public and private sector wages has not received a
great deal of attention. Two relatively recent exceptions are Arango and Posada
(2007) and Galvis (2010). Arango and Posada (2007) present a descriptive analysis
of the dynamic behaviour of public sector wages in several occupational categories.
An interesting feature of this work is that the authors use payroll information from
the Ministry of Finance, which covers the sample period 1978￿ 2005. On the other
hand, Galvis (2010) uses Colombian household survey data for the period 1984 to
2009, to study real wage disparities for private sector employees in the seven main
3These countries are Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia (urban only), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.
8metropolitan areas, namely Barranquilla, BogotÆ, Bucaramanga, Cali, Manizales,
Medell￿n and Pasto. This author ￿nds that there are signi￿cant di⁄erentials among
di⁄erent categories of private sector wages, and that in some cases these di⁄erentials
have been growing over time.
3 Methodology
3.1 Background
Economists typically use information that is available in three di⁄erent formats:
(i.) cross-section data; (ii.) time-series data; and (iii.) panel data. Cross-section
data describe the activities of individuals, ￿rms, countries or other units of analysis
that are collected at a particular moment in time. Time-series data describe the
movement of a variable through time, and this could be for di⁄erent periodicity such
as annual, quarterly, monthly, weekly or even daily. Lastly, panel data combine the
￿rst two types of information; that is, they describe the activities of individuals,
￿rms, countries or other units of analysis through time.
Focusing for the moment in the analysis of time-series data, the starting point
is the concept of stationarity. A time-series is said to be stationary if its probability
distribution function does not change through time. In practice, this de￿nition turns
out to be very strong and di¢ cult to verify, so that a weaker version of the con-
cept states that a time-series is "weakly stationary" (also referred to as "covariance
stationary") if its ￿rst two moments (i.e. its mean and its variance) do not change
over time. The intuition behind this de￿nition is that if the ￿rst two moments of a
time-series do not change through time, then its future is going to be similar to its
past, and this can be exploited for forecasting purposes.
Unfortunately, most to the time-series that are studied by economists and econo-
metricians alike, exhibit a tendency to increase over time, that is, they are non-
stationary series. This is case, for example of the series of the gross domestic prod-
uct (both in nominal and real terms), consumer price index, monetary aggregates,
employment, and wages, among others. From a statistical point of view, the use of
9non-stationary series involves a number of problems in the sense that conventional
hypothesis tests, con￿dence intervals and predictions about the future are not go-
ing to be reliable. A classic example of the problems that arise with the use of
non-stationary data is that of the non-sense regression problem discovered by Yule
(1926), or spurious regression problem in the terminology of Granger and Newbold
(1974). The idea is that when one estimates a regression between two or more vari-
ables that grow over time (whatever these variables may be), it is more likely than
not that one is going to ￿nd an apparent positive association between the variables,
regardless of whether this association truly exists.4
The solution to the problem of working with non-stationary series depends upon
the nature or cause of the non-stationarity, that is whether it is deterministic or
stochastic. Until the early 1980s, the trending behaviour of a time-series used to
be eliminated by running a regression of the series under consideration against a
linear (or even a polynomial) time trend. What this statistical approach does not
recognise, however, is that it is only valid when the rate of growth of the series is
always the same or, in other words, when it is constant. If, on the other hand,
the rate of growth of the series is not always the same (or if it cannot be predicted
perfectly), then the time series is said to have a stochastic trend, in which case the
suitable approach to eliminate the non-stationarity would be to calculate the ￿rst
di⁄erence of the series.
In time-series terminology, a series that needs to be di⁄erenced in order to become
stationary is said to be a series integrated of order 1, and is denoted ￿ I (1) for
short. In general, a series that needs to be di⁄erenced d times in order to become
stationary is said to be a series integrated of order d, and is denoted ￿ I (d). In
summary, economic time-series that exhibit a trending behaviour can be classi￿ed in
two groups. The ￿rst group is that of the series that are stationary around a linear
4Examples of the spurious regression problem include Yule (1926) who, using annual information
for the period 1866￿ 1911, ￿nds a correlation coe¢ cient of 95% between mortality rate in Enlgand
and Wales and the proportion of Church of England marriages. Another example is provided by
Hendry (1980) who ￿nds a correlation coe¢ cient of 98% between in￿ ation and cumulative rainfall
in the UK.
10or polynomial trend, which are referred to as Trend Stationary Processes (TSP).
The second group is that of the series that need to be di⁄erenced one or many more
times. Interestingly, it should be noticed that a stationary series is integrated of
order 0, denoted ￿ I (0), since it is not necessary to di⁄erence the series to make it
stationary.
The fact that a time-series can be classi￿ed as an ￿ I (0) or an ￿ I (1) process
can have important implications from an economic point of view. Indeed, in the
case of an ￿ I (0) series, a shock (or innovation) will have a temporary e⁄ect (i.e.
the e⁄ect of the shock disappears as time passes) and out-of-sample predictions are
more precise. On the contrary, in the case of an ￿ I (1) series, the e⁄ect of a shock
(or innovation) is permanent and out-of-sample predictions are less accurate; see
e.g. Franses (1998). More importantly, while the variance an ￿ I (0) series is ￿nite,
that of an ￿ I (1) series increases without a bound.
In the speci￿c case of public/ private sector wage di⁄erentials, which are the
purpose of analysis of this document, ￿nding that they can be best characterised as ￿
I (0) processes suggests that there would not be a tendency for them to consistently
increase (or decrease) over time. On the contrary, if public/ private sector wage
di⁄erentials are found to be ￿ I (1), then there would be arbitrage opportunities for
individuals by moving from one sector to the other. This, of course, may become
a serious obstacle for governments that aim to attract and maintain a productive
labour force in the public sector.
3.2 Unit-root and stationarity tests
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Dickey and
Fuller (1981) propose statistical tests to determine whether a time series can be
best characterised as TSP or DSP. These statistical tests are referred to in the
literature as unit-root tests.
Dickey and Fuller consider three di⁄erent models to test for a unit root:
11yt = ￿1yt￿1 + ￿t; (1)
yt = ￿0 + ￿1yt￿1 + ￿t; (2)
yt = ￿0 + ￿1yt￿1 + ￿2t + ￿t; (3)
where yt is the variable of interest (in our case a wage di⁄erential) for which we have
t = 1;:::;T available observations. These equations can be estimated by ordinary
least squares (OLS), and the null hypothesis to test the presence of a unit root is
H0 : ￿1 = 1, against the alternative that the series is stationary Ha : ￿1 < 1.
For practical purposes, model (1) is rarely estimated as it is too restrictive
because it assumes that yt has a mean of zero (the model is very important for
theoretical purposes though). In turn, model (2) is estimated when yt has a non-
zero mean, while model (3) is applied whenever yt exhibits an upward (or downward)
behaviour; for a more formal sequential testing procedure see Perron (1988). The
models considered by Dickey and Fuller can be alternatively reparameterised as:
￿yt = (￿1 ￿ 1)yt￿1 + ￿t;
￿yt = ￿0 + (￿1 ￿ 1)yt￿1 + ￿t;
￿yt = ￿0 + (￿1 ￿ 1)yt￿1 + ￿2t + ￿t;
where ￿yt is the ￿rst di⁄erence of the series of interest, i.e. ￿yt = yt ￿yt￿1. Notice
that testing the null hypothesis that H0 : ￿1 = 1 is equivalent to test H0 : b = 0 in
the following models:
￿yt = byt￿1 + ￿t; (4)
12￿yt = ￿0 + byt￿1 + ￿t; (5)
￿yt = ￿0 + byt￿1 + ￿2t + ￿t: (6)
To perform the unit-root test, one calculates the t-statistic associated to the esti-
mated coe¢ cient on yt￿1, which is then compared with the critical values tabulated
by Fuller (1976), Dickey and Fuller (1981), or the more recent response surfaces
estimated by MacKinnon (1991).
An important assumption behind the construction of the Dickey and Fuller tests
is that of no serial correlation, i.e. ￿t ￿ iid(0;￿2). If this assumption does not hold,
then Said and Dickey (1984) suggest introducing lags of the dependent variable in
order to whiten the residuals. Including lags of the dependent variable in equations
(4), (5) and (6) yields:












These three equations are referred to as the (Augmented) Dickey and Fuller
(1979) (ADF) test regressions.
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992) (KPSS) propose an alternative
approach, in which the null and alternative hypotheses are interchanged. That is,
they propose a residual-based Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for the null hypothesis
that a time series is stationary (either around a level or a deterministic time trend),
against the alternative that it is non-stationary.
KPSS consider the model:
13yt = ￿t + rt + ￿yt￿1 + "t;
where rt = rt￿1 + ut, "t is iid(0;￿2
"), ￿2
" = 1, ut is iid(0;￿2
u), and j￿j < 1.
Two cases of interest arise in the previous model setup. The ￿rst one occurs
when ￿2
u = 0, and the initial value of rt is assumed to be ￿xed and equal to r0. In
this case, yt is a stationary series around a linear trend term (it should be recalled
that j￿j < 1). Notice that if one further assumes that ￿ = 0, then yt is a stationary
series around a mean. The second one arises when ￿2
u > 0. In this case, yt becomes
non-stationary. Thus, the previous discussion implies that the KPSS test of the null
hypothesis that a series is stationary is given by H0 : ￿2
u = 0, while the alternative
hypothesis that it is non-stationary can be stated as Ha : ￿2
u > 0.









; j = 1;2
where St =
Pt
k=1^ "k is the partial sum of the residuals (^ "k) that result from running
a regression of yt against an intercept, for j = 1, or a regression of yt against
an intercept and a linear trend term, for j = 2, depending on whether the null
hypothesis of interest is that of stationarity around a mean, or around a linear
deterministic trend, respectively.
In addition, s2
T(l) is an estimator of the long-run variance of the correspond-
ing regression. In their original paper, KPSS propose a non-parametric estima-
tor of ^ ￿
2






, with q = 4;12. However, Caner and Kilian (2001) have
pointed out that stationarity tests, like the KPSS tests, exhibit very low power after
correcting for size distortions. Thus, in our paper we follow recent work by Sul,
Phillips, and Choi (2005), who propose a new boundary condition rule that im-
proves the size and power properties of the KPSS stationarity tests. In particular,
Sul et al. suggest the following procedure. First, an AR(p) model for the residuals
14is estimated, that is:
^ "t = ￿1^ "t￿1 + ::: + ￿p^ "t￿p + ￿t; (7)
where the lag length of the autoregression can be determined for example using the
GEneral-To-Speci￿c (GETS) algorithm proposed by Hall (1994) and Campbell and
Perron (1991). Second, the long-run variance estimate of ^ ￿
2
















where ^ ￿(1) = ^ ￿1 (1) + ::: + ^ ￿p (1) denotes the autoregressive polynomial evaluated
at L = 1. In turn, ^ ￿
2
￿ is the long-run variance estimate of the residuals in equa-
tion (14) that is obtained using a quadratic spectral window Heteroskedastic and
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) estimator.5
It is worth mentioning that although other unit-root tests are available in the
literature, see e.g. Maddala and Kim (1998) for a textbook exposition, in this doc-
ument we focus on the ADF and KPSS tests since they have already been extended
to deal with panel data. In the next section we brie￿ y review the panel unit-root
and stationarity tests that will be applied in this document.
3.3 Unit-root and stationarity tests in panel data
The problem of testing the presence of unit roots in panels of data has received a
great deal of attention in recent years; see e.g. the literature reviews in Breitung
and Pesaran (2008) and Banerjee and Wagner (2009). Among the tests available
in the literature, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS) test has proved to be
the most popular. This panel unit root test combines information from the time-
series dimension with that from the cross-section dimension, such that fewer time
5Additional Monte Carlo evidence reported by Carri￿n-i Silvestre and Sans￿ (2006) also indi-
cates that the proposal in Sul, Phillips, and Choi (2005) is to be preferred since the KPSS statistics
exhibit less size distortion and reasonable power.
15observations are required for the test to have power. The IPS test is based on
individual ADF test regressions:
￿yit = ai + biyi;t￿1 +
pi X
r=1
cir4yi;t￿r + "it; (9)
where yit denotes relative average wage (per hour) for individual i = 1;:::;N, at
time period t = 1;:::;T. In this setting, the null hypothesis to test the presence of
a unit root becomes H0 : bi = 0 for all i, against the alternative that at least one of
the individual series in the panel is stationary, that is H1 : bi < 0 for at least one
i. The IPS test averages the ADF statistics obtained in equation (9) across the N






where ti;T is the ADF test for the ith cross-sectional unit in the panel. IPS show
that after a suitable standardisation, the tbarNT statistic follows a standard normal
distribution. Moreover, they compute the mean and variance required to standardise
the tbarNT statistic via Monte Carlo simulations, for di⁄erent values of T and pi;
and for di⁄erent combinations of deterministic components; that is, when the test
regression (9) includes intercept but no trend, and when it includes both intercept
and trend.
An important assumption underlying the IPS test is that of cross section inde-
pendence among the individual time series in the panel. However, it has been shown
that the test su⁄ers from size distortions in the presence of cross section dependence,
the magnitude of which increases as the strength of the cross-sectional dependence
increases; see e.g. Strauss and Yigit (2003) and Pesaran (2007). To allow for the
presence of cross section dependence, Pesaran (2007) proposes to augment equation
(9) with the cross-sectional averages of lagged level and lagged ￿rst-di⁄erences of
the individual series in the panel. Thus, the test of the unit root hypothesis would
be based on the following pth order Cross-sectionally Augmented ADF (denoted
16CADF) regressions:
￿yit = ai + biyi;t￿1 +
p X
r=1
cir4yit￿r + di￿ yt￿1 +
p X
r=0
fir￿￿ yt￿r + "it; (10)
where ￿ yt is the cross section mean of yit, de￿ned as ￿ yt = (N)
￿1 PN
i=1 yit. The
corresponding cross-sectionally augmented version of the IPS test statistic (denoted






where ~ ti is the cross-sectional ADF statistic for the ith individual in the panel. Once
again, under the null hypothesis there is a unit root in all individuals in the panel,
i.e. H0 : bi = 0 for all i, while under the alternative at least one of the individual
series in the panel is stationary, i.e. H1 : bi < 0 for at least one i. The critical values
of the CIPS statistic are tabulated via Monte Carlo simulations by Pesaran (2007)
for various values of T and N and according to the deterministic elements included
in the cross-sectionally augmented ADF regressions, namely no intercepts and no
trends (Case I), intercepts only (Case II), and intercepts and trends (Case III).
An important issue that arises when using both the IPS and CIPS tests is that
due to the heterogeneous nature of the alternative hypothesis, one needs to be careful
when interpreting the results, because the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in
each cross section may be rejected when only a fraction of the series in the panel are
stationary. By contrast, Hadri (2000) proposes residual-based LM tests for the null
hypothesis that all the time series in the panel are stationary (either around a level
or a deterministic time trend), against the alternative that some of the series are
non-stationary. The Hadri tests thus o⁄er the advantage that if the null hypothesis
is not rejected, there would be evidence that all wage di⁄erentials in the panel are
stationary.
Following Hadri (2000), consider the models:
yit = rit + "it (11)
and
17yit = rit + ￿it + "it (12)
where rit is a random walk, rit = ri;t￿1+uit, and "it and uit are mutually independent
normal distributions. Also, "it and uit are i:i:d across i and over t, with E ["it] = 0,
E ["2
it] = ￿2
";i > 0, E [uit] = 0, E [u2
it] = ￿2
u;i ￿ 0, t = 1;:::;T and i = 1;:::;N.
The null hypothesis that all the series are stationary is given by H0 : ￿2
u;i = 0,
i = 1;:::;N, while the alternative that some of the series are non-stationary is
H1 : ￿2
u;i > 0, i = 1;:::;N1 and ￿2
u;i = 0, i = N1 + 1;:::;N.
Let ^ "it be the residuals from the regression of yit on an intercept, for model (11)
(or on an intercept and a linear trend term, for model (12)). Then, for individual i














"i is a consistent estimator of the long-run variance of ^ "it from the appropriate
regression, for which we follow the procedure suggested by Sul, Phillips, and Choi
(2005). This procedure was outlined earlier in a univariate context. Within a panel
framework, the procedure advocated by Sul et al. is implemented as follows: First,
for each individual i an AR model for the residuals is estimated, that is:
^ "it = ￿i;1^ "i;t￿1 + ::: + ￿i;pi^ "i;t￿pi + ￿it; (14)
where the lag length of the autoregression can be determined for example using the
GETS algorithm proposed by Hall (1994) and Campbell and Perron (1991). Second,
the long-run variance estimate of ^ ￿
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where ^ ￿i (1) = ^ ￿i;1 (1)+:::+^ ￿i;pi (1) denotes the autoregressive polynomial evaluated
at L = 1. In turn, ^ ￿
2
￿i is the long-run variance estimate of the residuals in equation
18(14) that is obtained using a quadratic spectral window HAC estimator.6
The Hadri (2000) panel stationarity test statistic is given by the simple average







which after a suitable standardisation, using appropriate moments, follows a stan-
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i are respectively the mean and variance
required for standardisation. Asymptotic values of these moments can be found in
Hadri (2000), while ￿nite sample critical values appear in Hadri and Larsson (2005).
The Monte Carlo experiments of Hadri (2000) illustrate that these tests have
good size properties for T and N su¢ ciently large. However, Giulietti, Otero, and
Smith (2009) show that even for relatively large T and N the Hadri (2000) tests
su⁄er from severe size distortions in the presence of cross-sectional dependence,
the magnitude of which increases as the strength of the cross-sectional dependence
increases. To correct for the size distortion caused by cross-sectional dependence,
Giulietti et al. apply the bootstrap method and ￿nd that the bootstrap Hadri tests
are approximately correctly sized.
To implement the bootstrap method in the context of the Hadri tests, we start
o⁄ by correcting for serial correlation using equation (14) and obtain ^ ￿it, which are
centred around zero. Next, as in Maddala and Wu (1999), the residuals ^ ￿it are
resampled with replacement with the cross-section index ￿xed, so that their cross-
correlation structure is preserved; the resulting bootstrap innovation ^ ￿it is denoted
^ ￿
￿
it. Then, ^ "
￿
it is generated recursively as:
6Additional Monte Carlo evidence reported by Carri￿n-i Silvestre and Sans￿ (2006) also indi-
cates that the proposal in Sul, Phillips, and Choi (2005) is to be preferred since the KPSS statistics
exhibit less size distortion and reasonable power.
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it = ^ ￿i;1^ "
￿





where, in order to ensure that initialisation of ^ "
￿
it, i.e. the bootstrap samples of
^ "it, becomes unimportant, we follow Chang (2004) who advocates generating a large
number of ^ "
￿
it, say T +Q values and discard the ￿rst Q values of ^ "
￿
it (for our purposes
we choose Q = 40). Lastly, the bootstrap samples of y￿
it are calculated by adding
^ "
￿
it to the deterministic component of the corresponding model, and the Hadri LM
statistic is calculated for each y￿
it. The previous steps are repeated several times in
order to derive the empirical distribution of the LM statistic, from which bootstrap
probability values (or alternatively bootstrap critical values) may be obtained.
4 Data
We use data from the nationwide household surveys periodically undertaken by
the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estad￿stica (DANE). Our period of
analysis, which runs from 1984 to 2005, is characterised by the implementation of
two di⁄erent surveys, namely the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENH) and the
Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH). The former was applied quarterly from 1979
to 2000, and up to 1983 included the four main cities: BogotÆ, Medell￿n, Cali and
Barranquilla. In 1984 three more cities were added to the ENH: Bucaramanga,
Manizales and Pasto. In 2001, the ENH was superseded by the ECH, which is a
monthly survey of thirteen cities: the original seven plus IbaguØ, Monter￿a, Carta-
gena, Pereira, Villavicencio and Cœcuta.7
The dataset used in the analysis consists of the hourly wage per worker. The
data for each year in the period 1984-2005 was obtained by aggregating the surveys
of that year. Appendix 1 reports the number of observations used in the analysis.
Appendix 2 presents the series of hourly wage per worker in current pesos. These
7The ECH also introduced changes in the phrasing of questions aimed at measuring labour mar-
ket indicators, such us the concept of unemployment, unpaid workers, etc. These methodological
di⁄erences do not a⁄ect our measure of hourly average wage.
20data are subsequently de￿ ated by the overall consumer price index (2005=100) to
account for the e⁄ect of in￿ ation; see Appendix 3.
The analysis of the evolution of wage di⁄erentials can be performed from di⁄erent
perspectives. To begin with, Figure 1 shows that during the ￿rst half of the sample
period the public/private wage di⁄erentials for male and female workers remain rel-
atively stable. Then, during the second half of the sample period, these di⁄erentials
start to increase favouring the public sector. In addition, the public/private wage
di⁄erential for male workers does not appear to be statistically di⁄erent from that
of female workers. Notice that the previous analysis was undertaken at a very high
level of aggregation, in the sense that we only looked at average wages in the public
and private sectors by gender. However, the advantage of using survey data (as we
do in this document) is that other additional dimensions can be exploited as well.
In particular, we also calculate:
1. Average wage in the public and private sectors by city. Here we use the main
seven metropolitan areas of the country that are available throughout the
sample period; namely (in alphabetical order) Bucaramanga, Barranquilla,
BogotÆ, Cali, Medell￿n, Manizales and Pasto.
2. Average wage in the public and private sectors by gender and by city.
3. Average wage in the public and private sectors by occupational category. Here
we consider the following four categories: managerial, professional, o¢ ce and
others.
4. Average wage in the public and private sectors by city and by occupational
category.
Figure 2 examines the regional dimension. This ￿gure shows that the pub-
lic/private sector wage di⁄erential seems to exhibit a similar pattern across cities.
In addition, Pasto presents the highest wage di⁄erential throughout the sample pe-
riod, although during the last part of the sample period the gap with Bucaramanga
21appears to be closing. This ￿nding may be explained by the fact that Pasto exhibits
a lower average wage in the private sector compared to other cities where smaller
gaps are observed (as in the case of BogotÆ). When one examines the gaps for male
and female workers it is clear that the one for Pasto can be explained by the fact
that the corresponding gap for men is wider than that observed for women; see
Figures 3 and 4.
Figures 5 to 8 plot wage gaps by occupational position. These ￿gures illustrate
an interesting ￿nding. While the public/private wage di⁄erentials for managerial
and professional employees (i.e. white collar employees) do not exhibit a signi￿-
cant variation, for the other two occupational positions (o¢ ce and others) the wage
di⁄erentials show a slight increase.
Figures 9 to 22 summarise wage di⁄erentials with respect to BogotÆ. When using
BogotÆ as the category to which others are compared, the computed gaps do not
show large changes over the sample period. Here there are two, somewhat expected,
results that must be highlighted: (i.) wages in BogotÆ are higher than in other
cities; and (ii.) in the private sector the wage gaps with respect to BogotÆ are much
larger than those observed for the public sector.
Figure 23 compares the distribution of wages for the years 1985 and 2005. As
can be seen from the ￿gure, the distribution of wages have not changed consider-
able through time. An interesting ￿nding is that private sector wages appear more
concentrated around the mean than public sector ones. When the data are further
analysed by occupational categories, other interesting results emerge. The distrib-
ution for managerial workers is very similar in the private and public sectors. For
o¢ ce workers the distribution of wages tends to be more concentrated, while for pro-
fessionals and workers in managerial activities the wage distributions exhibit more
variation around their respective means. On average, public sector wages tend to
be higher than private sector ones.
Figure 24 displays the distribution of wages in the public and private sectors
by city. In general terms, the patterns discussed in the previous paragraph can
22also be observed when examining wage distributions across cities, perhaps with the
exception of Pasto, where wages are found to be less concentrated. Medell￿n is the
city with the largest concentration in wage distribution, and the largest mean in the
private sector for 2005.
The previous results describe the behaviour of wages over time. However, for a
better understanding of the size of wage di⁄erentials is necessary to consider aspects
such as human capital formation and demographic (market segmentation) factors.
Thus, human capital formation appears in wage di⁄erentials when looking at the
occupational pro￿le of an individual, while demographic factors appear when exam-
ining di⁄erences by gender or by city. In fact, interesting results are uncovered when
one relates wage di⁄erentials to age (as a proxy of an individual￿ s work experience),
years of schooling, gender and occupational category.
In the case of the age, our results indicate that men have more experience for all
occupational positions, although di⁄erences in experience are smaller for blue collar
employees. By sector, higher levels of experience are found in public sector workers,
although in the case of white collar employees these di⁄erences tend to be smaller.
Important di⁄erences in experience are also found within blue collar employees,
which suggests that being an "o¢ ce employee" or being another type of "blue collar
employee" is determined by the educational level of the individual. The results just
described provide the necessary justi￿cation for studying the relationship between
public and private wages at a more disaggregated level.
Thus far, the analysis of wage di⁄erentials has been based on an informal vi-
sual inspection of the resulting series. In the following section we provide a more
formal statistical analysis to assess the time-series properties of the variables under
consideration.
5 Empirical analysis
Fluctuations in private and public sector wages have the potential to in￿ uence labour
mobility from the public to the private sector and viceversa. Against this back-
23ground, an assessment of whether wages in these two sectors maintain a stable
long-run equilibrium relationship can have implications for the necessity to adjust
remuneration in the public sector. Hence, there is considerable value in understand-
ing how public and private sector wages behave in relation to each other over time.
Our analysis examines three di⁄erent aspects of public/private sector wages. The
￿rst one is related to the time-series properties of the public/private wage di⁄erential
(Tables 1 and 2). The second one is concerned with the behaviour of public sector
wages relative to that existing in BogotÆ for an individual with similar character-
istics (Tables 3 and 4). Lastly, the third one is related to the behaviour of private
sector wages relative to that existing in BogotÆ for an individual with similar char-
acteristics (Tables 5 and 6). Thus, this sort of analysis allows us to examine wage
di⁄erentials existing between the public and private sectors, as well as those that
arise within each of these two sectors.
For the purposes of our empirical analysis, we examine the time-series properties
of the wage di⁄erentials calculated in the previous section. The conventional ADF
is applied to examine the unit-root null hypothesis for each wage di⁄erential. The
test is performed including an intercept in the test regression. Also, one lag of the
dependent variable is included in the test regression in order to ensure that the
residuals do not su⁄er from serial correlation; the number of lags of the dependent
variables is kept to a minimum due to the relatively small number of observations
(that is T = 22). In addition to the ADF test, we also apply the KPSS stationarity
test. For this, the model with an intercept (and no trend) is adopted in the empirical
analysis, which implies that we would be testing the null hypothesis that a wage
di⁄erential is stationary around a level. As indicated in the previous section, the
long-run variance required to calculate the KPSS statistic is consistently estimated
using the new boundary condition rule put forward by Sul, Phillips, and Choi (2005).
Furthermore, to correct for possible serial correlation the autoregressive processes
in (14) are estimated for up to p = 3 lags, and the optimal number of lags is
chosen based on the GETS algorithm. This algorithm involves testing whether
24the last autoregressive coe¢ cient is statistically di⁄erent from zero (say, at the
10% signi￿cance level); if it is not statistically signi￿cant, then the order of the
autoregression is reduced by one until the last coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant.
Then, we turn our attention to panel unit-root and panel stationarity tests. The
main motivation for statistical testing using a panel of data instead of individual
time series is that it has been noted that the power of the tests increases with
the number of cross-sections in the panel. Thus, we ￿rst calculate the IPS test
which tests the null hypothesis of a unit root in all individuals in the panel, and
is based on the assumption of independence across individuals. Then, to allow for
potential cross section dependence, we also calculate two additional tests: (i) the
CIPS test for panel unit-root; and (ii.) the bootstrap Hadri panel stationarity test
(the corresponding bootstrap p-values are based on 2,000 replications used to derive
the empirical distributions of the test statistics). It should be recalled that failure
to account for potential cross section dependence will result in severe size distortion
of both the IPS and Hadri test statistics.
Table 1 reports the results of applying the ADF unit-root and KPSS stationarity
tests to public/private wage di⁄erentials by population group (i.e. male, female and
total) and city (i.e. Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, BogotÆ, Cali, Medell￿n, Manizales
and Pasto). The results of the ADF test consistently fail to reject the null hypothesis
of non-stationarity, while for the KPSS test evidence is mixed (the null hypothesis
of stationarity is rejected in 10 out of 21 possible cases). Thus, evidence that wages
are linked by a stable long-run equilibrium relationship is not particularly strong,
when the series are examined in isolation. The bottom part of Table 1 reports the
results of applying the panel tests. According to our ￿ndings, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis of joint non-stationarity when using the IPS test, but not when using
the CIPS test. This result highlights the importance of allowing for the presence of
cross section dependence in the data. Turning to the bootstrap Hadri test, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of joint stationarity for male workers. In the case of
all (total) and female workers, the null hypothesis of joint stationarity is rejected at
25the 5% (but not at the 1%) signi￿cance level; the resulting test statistics for all and
female workers are 3.718 [p-value = 0.021] and 4.532 [p-value = 0.026], respectively.
The reason why the CIPS and Hadri tests o⁄er con￿ icting results may be due to the
fact that the wage di⁄erentials are rather aggregate, as they do not discriminate by
occupational category.
Table 2 reports the results for public/private wage di⁄erential by occupational
category and city. When the series are considered in isolation results tend to be
con￿ icting in the sense that both the ADF and KPSS tests either reject or fail
to reject the null hypothesis. Panel tests, on the other hand, tell a completely
di⁄erent story. In this case, the CIPS test rejects the null hypothesis of joint non-
stationarity for all occupational categories (i.e. managerial, professional, o¢ ce and
other), suggesting that at least one of the series in each panel is stationary. Stronger
evidence in favour of stationarity is provided by the bootstrap Hadri test, as we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of joint stationarity for any of the four occupational
categories under consideration. These ￿ndings suggest that public and private sector
wages maintain a long-run equilibrium relationship when analysed by occupational
category, and after taking into account the presence of cross section dependence in
the form of shocks (or innovations) that a⁄ect all series simultaneously.
Table 3 shows that the results when the tests are applied to public sector wages
relative to the wage of an individual in the public sector in BogotÆ. The conven-
tional ADF test rejects the existence of a unit root in the wage di⁄erentials under
consideration, except in the cases of male workers in the cities of Cali and Medell￿n.
As to the KPSS test, we reject the stationarity null hypothesis in the cases of female
workers in the cities of Bucaramanga, Medell￿n and Manizales. For the remaining 13
out of 18 cases the results of the univariate tests are consistent, in the sense that the
ADF test rejects the null hypothesis, but the KPSS does not. Regarding the panel
tests, the CIPS fails to reject the unit-root null hypothesis, although the calculated
test statistics (￿ 2.082, ￿ 2.035 and ￿ 2.149 for total, male and female workers, respec-
tively) are relatively close to the 10% critical value tabulated by Pesaran (2007) (i.e.
26￿ 2.210). Overall,the results support the view that wage di⁄erentials are stationary.
Table 4 presents the results for the case of the public sector wage di⁄erential
for the four occupational categories that are considered, with respect to the public
sector wage of an individual in the same occupational category in BogotÆ. As
can be seen from the table, the results of the univariate unit-root and stationarity
tests provide tend to favour the view that the wage di⁄erentials are stationary, in
particular when looking at the results of the KPSS test (where we fail to reject the
null of stationarity in 20 out of 24 cases). Turning to the results of the panel tests,
they also provide support that the public sector wage di⁄erential with respect to
BogotÆ are stationary, with the exception of the CIPS test for individuals whose
occupational category is "o¢ ce".
The last two tables relate to wage di⁄erentials that involve the private sector.
Table 5 shows the results when the tests are applied to private sector wages with
respect to the wage of an individual with similar characteristics in the private sector
in BogotÆ. In this case the results of the univariate ADF and KPSS tests provide
mixed evidence. However, the panel IPS, CIPS and Hadri tests provide support for
the view that private sector wage di⁄erentials with respect to BogotÆ are stationary
when considered as a panel of data. Indeed, while the IPS and CIPS reject the
unit-root null hypothesis for the total population as well as for male and female
workers, the Hadri tests fail to reject the null of stationarity.
Table 6 reports the results of private sector wage di⁄erentials with respect to
Bogota for the occupational categories under consideration. In this case the results
of the univariate tests are mixed. The panel tests, on the other hand, provide
support for the view that the di⁄erentials are stationary, especially after allowing
for the e⁄ect of cross section dependence (the CIPS test statistic for "professional"
workers is close to the 10% critical value).
276 Concluding remarks
In this document we have examined the time-series properties of the wage di⁄eren-
tials that arise between the public and private sector in Colombia. The analysis has
been based on information taken from nationwide household surveys. The utilisation
of survey data o⁄ers the advantage that one can go beyond the typical calculation
of the public/private sector wage di⁄erential for male and female workers, as well as
for all workers. Indeed, the data can be analysed at a very high level of disaggrega-
tion. In particular, the dimensions that were studied in this document include: (i.)
gender; (ii.) regional; and (iii.) occupational category.
Our ￿ndings indicate con￿ icting results in the unit-root and stationarity tests
when one focuses on wage di⁄erentials at an aggregate level (such as for men, women
and both). This is regardless of whether one is looking at each wage di⁄erential in
isolation of the others, or jointly as a panel of data.
However, when we analyse wage di⁄erentials at higher levels of disaggregation,
treat them jointly as a panel of data, and allow for the presence of potential cross
section dependence, there is more supportive evidence for the view that wage di⁄er-
entials are stationary. In other words, average wages (in levels) appear to be linked
by a stable long-run equilibrium relationship. In graphical terms, this long-run equi-
librium relationship can be depicted as a 45 degree line, which plays the role of an
attractor around which average wages ￿ uctuate; in the short run, it may well be
that average wages lie above (or below) this attractor. The economic importance of
this ￿nding is that despite the fact that wage di⁄erentials exist, they have not been
consistently increasing (or decreasing) over time. If average wages were not linked
by a long-run equilibrium relationship, there would exist non-negligible incentives
for workers to move out of the public sector, which would undoubtedly jeopardise
the ability of the public sector to attract and retain a productive and competitive
labour force.
28Table 1. public/private wage di⁄erential
Univariate unit-root and stationarity tests
Group City p ADF p KPSS
Total Bucaramanga 1 -0.151 1 0.581 z
Barranquilla 1 -1.629 1 0.253
BogotÆ 1 -0.488 2 0.144
Cali 1 0.884 1 0.524 z
Medell￿n 1 -1.007 1 0.334
Manizales 1 -0.709 1 0.371 y
Pasto 1 -0.438 1 0.396 y
Male Bucaramanga 1 -0.598 1 0.297
Barranquilla 1 -1.182 3 0.443 y
BogotÆ 1 -1.241 2 0.132
Cali 1 -0.024 1 0.308
Medell￿n 1 -1.102 2 0.194
Manizales 1 -0.778 1 0.402 y
Pasto 1 -0.742 2 0.267
Female Bucaramanga 1 -0.234 1 1.076 z
Barranquilla 1 -2.082 1 0.484 z
BogotÆ 1 -0.330 2 0.131
Cali 1 0.196 1 0.375 y
Medell￿n 1 -1.114 1 0.380 y
Manizales 1 -0.877 1 0.253
Pasto 1 -0.859 1 0.205
Panel unit-root and stationarity tests
Group IPS CIPS Hadri
Total 2.795 -3.040 z 3.718 z
Male 1.954 -3.490 z 2.218
Female 2.099 -2.930 z 4.532 z
Notes: y and z indicate 10 and 5% levels of signi￿cance, respectively, based on critical
values calculated from the response surfaces in MacKinnon (1991) for the ADF test, and
Sephton (1995) for the KPSS test. The IPS statistic is compared against the (lower tail
of the) standard normal distribution, while the CIPS statistic is compared against critical
values tabulated by Pesaran (2007). To account for potential cross section dependence,
the statistical signi￿cance of the Hadri test is based on a bootstrap procedure that is
implemented using 2,000 replications.
29Table 2. public/private wage di⁄erential by occupational category and city
Univariate unit-root and stationarity tests
Occupational category City p ADF p KPSS
Managerial Bucaramanga 1 -2.389 3 0.159
Barranquilla 1 -1.407 1 0.330
BogotÆ 1 -0.910 2 0.057
Cali 1 -3.356 z 1 0.582 z
Medell￿n 1 -2.640 1 0.357 y
Manizales 1 -1.779 2 0.205
Pasto 1 -1.724 1 0.305
Professional Bucaramanga 1 -2.060 1 0.356
Barranquilla 1 -2.969 y 1 0.256
BogotÆ 1 -1.964 1 0.314
Cali 1 -1.861 1 0.401 y
Medell￿n 1 -2.382 1 0.429 y
Manizales 1 -1.174 1 0.276
Pasto 1 -4.153 z 1 0.415 y
O¢ ce Bucaramanga 1 -0.812 2 0.156
Barranquilla 1 -0.572 2 0.193
BogotÆ 1 -0.737 1 0.201
Cali 1 -0.244 1 0.197
Medell￿n 1 -1.587 1 0.328
Manizales 1 -0.475 1 0.216
Pasto 1 0.428 y 0.254
Other Bucaramanga 1 -0.341 1 0.270
Barranquilla 1 -2.512 1 0.442 y
BogotÆ 1 0.064 2 0.157
Cali 1 0.011 1 0.241
Medell￿n 1 -0.262 1 0.256
Manizales 1 -1.353 1 0.314
Pasto 1 -1.096 1 0.265
Panel unit-root and stationarity tests
Occupational category IPS CIPS Hadri
Managerial -1.421 y -2.275 y 2.090
Professional -2.352 z -3.015 z 3.298
O¢ ce 2.613 -3.060 z 0.873
Other 2.025 -2.954 z 1.950
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
30Table 3. Public wage relative to public wage in BogotÆ
Univariate unit-root and stationarity tests
Group City p ADF p KPSS
Total Bucaramanga 1 -3.741 z 1 0.223
Barranquilla 1 -3.048 z 1 0.204
Cali 1 -2.648 y 1 0.223
Medell￿n 1 -2.690 y 1 0.118
Manizales 1 -3.885 z 1 0.157
Pasto 1 -2.956 y 1 0.155
Male Bucaramanga 1 -4.441 z 1 0.232
Barranquilla 1 -2.968 y 1 0.129
Cali 1 -2.478 1 0.264
Medell￿n 1 -1.843 2 0.098
Manizales 1 -2.698 y 1 0.158
Pasto 1 -2.780 y 1 0.237
Female Bucaramanga 1 -3.046 z 1 0.390 y
Barranquilla 1 -2.737 y 1 0.166
Cali 1 -3.012 y 1 0.125
Medell￿n 1 -3.356 z 1 0.513 z
Manizales 1 -4.988 z 1 0.813 z
Pasto 1 -3.051 z 1 0.208
Panel unit-root and stationarity tests
Group IPS CIPS Hadri
Total -4.214 z -2.082 0.100
Male -3.462 z -2.035 0.211
Female -4.735 z -2.149 3.397
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
31Table 4. Public wage relative to public wage in BogotÆ by occupational category
Univariate unit-root and stationarity tests
Occupational category City p ADF p KPSS
Managerial Bucaramanga 1 -3.238 z 1 0.237
Barranquilla 1 -2.281 1 0.347
Cali 1 -1.836 1 0.408 y
Medell￿n 1 -3.050 z 1 0.350
Manizales 1 -1.734 2 0.049
Pasto 1 -3.126 z 1 0.310
Professional Bucaramanga 1 -1.496 3 0.058
Barranquilla 1 -2.193 1 0.460 y
Cali 1 -3.265 z 1 0.214
Medell￿n 1 -2.294 1 0.101
Manizales 1 -3.415 z 1 0.217
Pasto 1 -2.080 1 0.372 y
O¢ ce Bucaramanga 1 -4.421 z 1 0.100
Barranquilla 1 -1.918 1 0.058
Cali 1 -3.779 z 1 0.177
Medell￿n 1 -3.701 z 1 0.118
Manizales 1 -2.675 y 1 0.069
Pasto 1 -2.987 y 1 0.090
Other Bucaramanga 1 -2.865 y 1 0.237
Barranquilla 1 -4.222 z 3 0.825 z
Cali 1 -1.634 1 0.081
Medell￿n 1 -1.527 1 0.172
Manizales 1 -1.840 1 0.271
Pasto 1 -1.904 1 0.249
Panel unit-root and stationarity tests
Occupational category IPS CIPS Hadri
Managerial -2.633 z -2.592 z 1.906
Professional -2.410 z -1.946 1.093
O¢ ce -4.432 z -2.324 z -1.263
Other -2.090 z -2.713 z 2.298
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
32Table 5. Private wage relative to private wage in BogotÆ
Univariate unit-root and stationarity tests
Group City p ADF p KPSS
Total Bucaramanga 1 -1.809 1 0.652 z
Barranquilla 1 -3.001 y 1 0.532 z
Cali 1 -1.561 1 0.331
Medell￿n 1 -2.392 1 0.223
Manizales 1 -2.525 1 0.417 y
Pasto 1 -1.932 1 0.127
Male Bucaramanga 1 -1.784 1 0.480 y
Barranquilla 1 -2.728 y 1 0.494 z
Cali 1 -1.756 1 0.268
Medell￿n 1 -2.036 1 0.176
Manizales 1 -2.204 1 0.229
Pasto 1 -2.276 1 0.136
Female Bucaramanga 1 -2.113 1 0.607 z
Barranquilla 1 -3.624 z 1 0.408 y
Cali 1 -1.686 2 0.296
Medell￿n 1 -3.674 z 1 0.272
Manizales 1 -2.950 y 1 0.848 z
Pasto 1 -1.985 1 0.135
Panel unit-root and stationarity tests
Group IPS CIPS Hadri
Total -1.760 z -2.394 z 3.594
Male -1.574 y -2.389 z 2.144
Female -2.961 z -2.355 z 4.416
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
33Table 6. Private wage relative to private wage in BogotÆ by occupational category
Univariate unit-root and stationarity tests
Occupational category City p ADF p KPSS
Managerial Bucaramanga 1 -1.793 1 0.227
Barranquilla 1 -0.946 2 0.093
Cali 1 -1.954 1 0.615 z
Medell￿n 1 -2.609 1 0.497 z
Manizales 1 -1.975 1 0.175
Pasto 1 -2.863 y 1 0.284
Professional Bucaramanga 1 -2.910 y 1 0.134
Barranquilla 1 -2.154 1 0.623 z
Cali 1 -2.212 1 0.503 z
Medell￿n 1 -2.426 1 0.297
Manizales 1 -2.330 1 0.649 z
Pasto 1 -2.203 2 0.127
O¢ ce Bucaramanga 1 -2.929 y 1 0.523 z
Barranquilla 1 -2.039 1 0.127
Cali 1 -1.718 1 0.428 y
Medell￿n 1 -3.286 z 1 0.418 y
Manizales 1 -2.214 1 0.273
Pasto 1 -2.403 1 0.160
Other Bucaramanga 1 -1.956 1 0.126
Barranquilla 1 -2.516 1 0.119
Cali 1 -2.144 1 0.087
Medell￿n 1 -2.005 1 0.102
Manizales 1 -1.746 1 0.151
Pasto 1 -1.131 1 0.081
Panel unit-root and stationarity tests
Occupational category IPS CIPS Hadri
Managerial -1.299 y -2.731 z 2.456
Professional -2.193 z -2.065 3.741
O¢ ce -2.345 z -2.574 z 2.570
Other -1.025 -2.283 y -1.103
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
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51Appendix 1.1
Number of individuals
Year Public sector Private sector
Total Male Female Total Male Female
1984 353,829 208,881 144,948 1,627,085 1,082,388 544,697
1985 325,880 186,414 139,466 1,583,657 1,033,240 550,417
1986 339,190 197,353 141,837 1,716,702 1,118,180 598,522
1987 334,863 195,259 139,604 1,813,819 1,170,527 643,292
1988 373,542 216,328 157,214 1,959,645 1,260,705 698,940
1989 384,937 213,866 171,071 2,073,134 1,311,360 761,774
1990 408,453 230,556 177,897 2,226,004 1,407,493 818,511
1991 408,637 227,033 181,604 2,202,571 1,349,841 852,730
1992 381,678 204,755 176,923 2,345,323 1,431,521 913,802
1993 333,928 178,987 154,941 2,430,904 1,464,311 966,593
1994 372,447 202,342 170,105 2,706,833 1,640,939 1,065,894
1995 353,633 188,241 165,392 2,674,789 1,581,852 1,092,937
1996 357,547 192,411 165,136 2,604,232 1,541,076 1,063,156
1997 359,647 177,172 182,475 2,457,603 1,432,777 1,024,826
1998 385,943 193,585 192,358 2,542,859 1,467,139 1,075,720
1999 357,503 188,129 169,374 2,358,363 1,345,970 1,012,393
2000 326,495 160,153 166,342 2,378,727 1,342,309 1,036,418
2001 282,292 140,793 141,499 2,168,774 1,194,977 973,797
2002 277,244 133,873 143,371 2,217,958 1,223,511 994,447
2003 248,915 129,764 119,151 2,233,967 1,236,701 997,266
2004 283,588 137,255 146,333 2,454,722 1,356,310 1,098,412
2005 324,464 166,478 157,986 2,940,383 1,628,181 1,312,202
Notes: The number of individuals presented in this Appendix is calculated using the
corresponding expansion factor in each survey.
52Appendix 1.2 (continued)
Number of individuals in the public sector
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 20,704 24,507 181,288 41,199 58,343 14,650 13,138
1985 16,593 20,600 171,626 39,249 54,165 12,088 11,559
1986 19,762 22,530 174,432 41,481 54,069 15,106 11,810
1987 22,757 23,620 166,775 43,854 52,403 13,681 11,773
1988 28,536 23,392 185,794 43,014 62,179 17,303 13,324
1989 27,815 30,288 187,822 49,866 55,008 18,174 15,964
1990 28,683 38,237 190,270 48,146 66,677 20,181 16,259
1991 28,765 40,567 189,885 48,987 65,759 19,468 15,206
1992 28,165 31,008 176,659 45,529 66,885 18,450 14,982
1993 27,233 26,727 145,827 41,809 60,951 16,105 15,276
1994 25,390 25,522 175,696 45,190 67,504 16,239 16,906
1995 26,054 26,590 158,816 44,658 65,410 16,133 15,972
1996 26,367 33,150 167,121 37,696 59,736 16,572 16,905
1997 27,098 35,244 170,971 36,321 57,908 15,152 16,953
1998 27,743 34,310 181,472 47,165 63,490 16,342 15,421
1999 21,037 32,117 170,931 44,611 59,523 15,813 13,471
2000 20,114 25,096 161,795 41,717 51,319 13,067 13,387
2001 20,444 28,153 135,385 31,066 43,167 12,225 11,852
2002 15,548 26,402 146,356 27,472 38,030 12,105 11,331
2003 15,967 23,006 123,699 25,262 39,430 11,472 10,079
2004 17,959 23,029 150,581 24,659 45,031 12,036 10,293
2005 21,407 26,464 162,027 35,814 56,191 11,725 10,836
53Appendix 1.3 (continued)
Number of individuals in the private sector
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 84,973 135,610 748,996 240,995 345,813 42,152 28,546
1985 69,006 113,673 777,391 241,494 317,379 35,575 29,139
1986 80,274 123,517 820,343 259,273 365,858 40,206 27,231
1987 99,348 134,515 832,096 291,914 382,537 43,772 29,637
1988 113,445 134,398 884,786 318,553 428,234 50,171 30,058
1989 119,812 167,548 958,686 323,317 421,620 51,382 30,769
1990 128,173 188,116 1,044,400 337,039 439,076 57,062 32,138
1991 140,582 192,307 995,893 343,222 443,070 53,819 33,678
1992 142,964 206,746 1,103,447 335,836 457,010 60,496 38,824
1993 150,386 209,307 1,117,665 365,417 492,807 59,243 36,079
1994 164,222 226,787 1,273,863 381,906 556,343 62,814 40,898
1995 168,085 200,097 1,304,696 364,460 531,846 62,981 42,624
1996 162,258 203,854 1,276,899 335,213 520,229 61,998 43,781
1997 155,079 203,107 1,151,012 337,285 500,584 66,312 44,224
1998 149,741 205,843 1,222,758 355,767 501,067 62,305 45,378
1999 126,499 186,355 1,162,433 346,872 440,373 55,119 40,712
2000 141,974 188,651 1,172,697 359,314 418,428 53,399 44,264
2001 149,463 195,476 1,033,847 331,969 354,741 59,905 43,373
2002 138,938 191,629 1,086,762 321,426 368,550 68,902 41,751
2003 150,117 177,026 1,052,160 338,429 407,271 63,866 45,098
2004 164,653 170,653 1,150,760 367,267 490,928 65,633 44,828
2005 198,533 211,382 1,386,525 454,267 575,506 66,556 47,614
54Appendix 1.4 (continued)
Number of male individuals in the public sector
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 11,837 15,719 105,325 25,982 34,073 8,204 7,741
1985 8,828 11,964 96,977 23,902 31,548 6,479 6,716
1986 11,376 13,947 98,735 26,105 31,389 8,682 7,119
1987 13,173 15,287 95,498 26,885 29,529 7,896 6,991
1988 16,256 14,017 108,533 26,024 33,659 9,787 8,052
1989 14,973 17,502 101,997 29,812 30,537 9,544 9,501
1990 15,755 23,168 106,414 28,239 36,216 11,568 9,196
1991 16,321 24,237 104,054 26,605 36,208 10,772 8,836
1992 14,937 18,148 92,727 24,609 35,500 10,252 8,582
1993 14,716 15,796 74,002 24,369 32,847 8,412 8,845
1994 13,538 13,959 94,054 25,605 36,805 8,629 9,752
1995 14,008 14,318 84,322 25,012 34,151 7,899 8,531
1996 13,341 18,521 89,192 22,211 31,726 8,201 9,219
1997 13,144 18,288 78,442 20,490 30,214 7,598 8,996
1998 13,503 17,590 89,609 25,266 31,099 7,866 8,652
1999 11,385 17,052 89,689 23,352 31,619 7,690 7,342
2000 10,377 12,186 77,791 21,831 24,648 6,053 7,267
2001 9,458 13,531 68,309 15,842 21,050 6,137 6,466
2002 6,919 12,369 69,591 13,260 19,652 6,260 5,822
2003 7,181 11,575 66,929 12,878 19,908 5,796 5,497
2004 9,089 10,522 71,899 12,179 22,161 5,907 5,498
2005 11,012 13,255 82,337 19,338 28,982 5,737 5,817
55Appendix 1.5 (continued)
Number of male individuals in the private sector
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 55,858 96,373 479,970 164,797 234,543 30,115 20,732
1985 42,086 79,025 493,287 160,798 211,487 25,377 21,180
1986 52,309 86,171 515,145 170,876 246,732 27,357 19,590
1987 63,005 93,991 516,326 193,197 252,675 30,449 20,884
1988 72,468 93,996 548,011 209,718 279,471 35,967 21,074
1989 74,152 111,700 582,647 214,384 271,721 35,290 21,466
1990 79,992 127,549 640,875 217,665 279,260 40,232 21,920
1991 88,332 129,426 584,102 215,330 274,472 36,210 21,969
1992 85,413 139,099 645,553 209,117 284,813 40,786 26,740
1993 88,983 138,416 646,441 225,989 303,330 37,957 23,195
1994 100,809 151,675 738,948 235,985 344,973 42,356 26,193
1995 103,928 129,752 733,731 219,760 325,523 41,548 27,610
1996 96,986 131,016 726,827 202,893 315,382 41,459 26,513
1997 90,072 125,333 641,095 202,172 302,877 43,493 27,735
1998 87,389 127,177 682,046 208,616 293,151 39,876 28,884
1999 70,086 114,672 641,208 203,218 256,025 34,721 26,040
2000 77,747 115,095 643,559 209,981 237,883 31,601 26,443
2001 85,102 117,917 548,511 190,326 190,210 36,324 26,587
2002 78,397 116,969 571,251 182,327 206,207 42,779 25,581
2003 82,791 108,565 560,270 194,501 223,875 38,724 27,975
2004 93,667 105,240 614,756 208,846 268,731 38,307 26,763
2005 108,846 129,286 740,947 260,847 320,843 39,127 28,285
56Appendix 1.6 (continued)
Number of female individuals in the public sector
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 8,867 8,788 75,963 15,217 24,270 6,446 5,397
1985 7,765 8,636 74,649 15,347 22,617 5,609 4,843
1986 8,386 8,583 75,697 15,376 22,680 6,424 4,691
1987 9,584 8,333 71,277 16,969 22,874 5,785 4,782
1988 12,280 9,375 77,261 16,990 28,520 7,516 5,272
1989 12,842 12,786 85,825 20,054 24,471 8,630 6,463
1990 12,928 15,069 83,856 19,907 30,461 8,613 7,063
1991 12,444 16,330 85,831 22,382 29,551 8,696 6,370
1992 13,228 12,860 83,932 20,920 31,385 8,198 6,400
1993 12,517 10,931 71,825 17,440 28,104 7,693 6,431
1994 11,852 11,563 81,642 19,585 30,699 7,610 7,154
1995 12,046 12,272 74,494 19,646 31,259 8,234 7,441
1996 13,026 14,629 77,929 15,485 28,010 8,371 7,686
1997 13,954 16,956 92,529 15,831 27,694 7,554 7,957
1998 14,240 16,720 91,863 21,899 32,391 8,476 6,769
1999 9,652 15,065 81,242 21,259 27,904 8,123 6,129
2000 9,737 12,910 84,004 19,886 26,671 7,014 6,120
2001 10,986 14,622 67,076 15,224 22,117 6,088 5,386
2002 8,629 14,033 76,765 14,212 18,378 5,845 5,509
2003 8,786 11,431 56,770 12,384 19,522 5,676 4,582
2004 8,870 12,507 78,682 12,480 22,870 6,129 4,795
2005 10,395 13,209 79,690 16,476 27,209 5,988 5,019
57Appendix 1.7 (continued)
Number of female individuals in the private sector
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 29,115 39,237 269,026 76,198 111,270 12,037 7,814
1985 26,920 34,648 284,104 80,696 105,892 10,198 7,959
1986 27,965 37,346 305,198 88,397 119,126 12,849 7,641
1987 36,343 40,524 315,770 98,717 129,862 13,323 8,753
1988 40,977 40,402 336,775 108,835 148,763 14,204 8,984
1989 45,660 55,848 376,039 108,933 149,899 16,092 9,303
1990 48,181 60,567 403,525 119,374 159,816 16,830 10,218
1991 52,250 62,881 411,791 127,892 168,598 17,609 11,709
1992 57,551 67,647 457,894 126,719 172,197 19,710 12,084
1993 61,403 70,891 471,224 139,428 189,477 21,286 12,884
1994 63,413 75,112 534,915 145,921 211,370 20,458 14,705
1995 64,157 70,345 570,965 144,700 206,323 21,433 15,014
1996 65,272 72,838 550,072 132,320 204,847 20,539 17,268
1997 65,007 77,774 509,917 135,113 197,707 22,819 16,489
1998 62,352 78,666 540,712 147,151 207,916 22,429 16,494
1999 56,413 71,683 521,225 143,654 184,348 20,398 14,672
2000 64,227 73,556 529,138 149,333 180,545 21,798 17,821
2001 64,361 77,559 485,336 141,643 164,531 23,581 16,786
2002 60,541 74,660 515,511 139,099 162,343 26,123 16,170
2003 67,326 68,461 491,890 143,928 183,396 25,142 17,123
2004 70,986 65,413 536,004 158,421 222,197 27,326 18,065
2005 89,687 82,096 645,578 193,420 254,663 27,429 19,329
58Appendix 1.8 (continued)
Number of individuals by occupational category
Year Public sector Private sector
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 7,575 116,510 104,078 125,666 21,174 123,783 300,559 1,181,569
1985 6,168 112,767 93,139 113,806 20,641 130,454 281,311 1,151,251
1986 7,172 115,294 97,024 119,700 18,569 142,531 300,503 1,255,099
1987 6,899 109,731 95,803 122,430 20,713 142,686 307,089 1,343,331
1988 6,485 130,203 105,156 131,698 27,535 157,372 330,506 1,444,232
1989 9,438 135,188 105,763 134,548 33,109 188,757 353,351 1,497,917
1990 9,072 146,642 107,027 145,712 38,642 195,655 376,301 1,615,406
1991 9,719 144,855 107,602 146,461 34,635 201,535 387,737 1,578,664
1992 7,586 145,811 94,249 134,032 42,435 217,110 406,244 1,679,534
1993 7,295 123,157 83,575 119,901 44,651 219,275 417,775 1,749,203
1994 9,787 145,261 91,128 126,271 52,433 253,360 488,610 1,912,430
1995 9,500 135,672 86,721 121,740 43,297 253,834 488,900 1,888,758
1996 11,329 143,954 80,868 121,396 49,079 260,430 478,913 1,815,810
1997 12,257 154,027 81,456 111,907 51,975 287,339 475,463 1,642,826
1998 12,615 170,945 88,611 113,772 60,804 314,614 479,980 1,687,461
1999 10,771 153,852 78,417 114,463 60,657 277,559 447,768 1,572,379
2000 12,492 142,278 71,105 100,620 60,575 286,976 448,709 1,582,467
2001 12,306 128,608 56,952 84,426 59,917 257,654 419,401 1,431,802
2002 8,419 132,032 61,358 75,435 73,505 261,304 436,217 1,446,932
2003 8,591 123,402 48,897 68,025 81,837 266,871 428,926 1,456,333
2004 7,297 144,764 56,526 75,001 94,804 311,363 484,982 1,563,573
2005 14,812 160,541 64,052 85,059 123,155 354,460 589,886 1,872,882
59Appendix 1.9 (continued)
Number of individuals in the public sector by occupational category
Year Male Female
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 5,211 58,532 52,601 92,537 2,364 57,978 51,477 33,129
1985 4,576 54,760 44,289 82,789 1,592 58,007 48,850 31,017
1986 5,591 56,648 46,737 88,377 1,581 58,646 50,287 31,323
1987 5,846 52,309 46,188 90,916 1,053 57,422 49,615 31,514
1988 4,926 62,610 51,595 97,197 1,559 67,593 53,561 34,501
1989 7,428 64,171 47,351 94,916 2,010 71,017 58,412 39,632
1990 5,853 71,879 50,935 101,889 3,219 74,763 56,092 43,823
1991 7,174 69,074 49,276 101,509 2,545 75,781 58,326 44,952
1992 4,798 66,719 40,359 92,879 2,788 79,092 53,890 41,153
1993 5,381 53,298 37,761 82,547 1,914 69,859 45,814 37,354
1994 5,987 65,783 40,326 90,246 3,800 79,478 50,802 36,025
1995 6,055 59,242 35,620 87,324 3,445 76,430 51,101 34,416
1996 7,199 64,316 33,539 87,357 4,130 79,638 47,329 34,039
1997 6,839 62,443 34,246 73,644 5,418 91,584 47,210 38,263
1998 7,714 73,349 33,243 79,279 4,901 97,596 55,368 34,493
1999 6,203 66,169 33,453 82,304 4,568 87,683 44,964 32,159
2000 7,895 54,738 26,364 71,156 4,597 87,540 44,741 29,464
2001 6,519 51,879 22,096 60,299 5,787 76,729 34,856 24,127
2002 4,425 54,233 21,360 53,855 3,994 77,799 39,998 21,580
2003 5,085 54,920 17,867 51,892 3,506 68,482 31,030 16,133
2004 4,724 56,678 20,941 54,912 2,573 88,086 35,585 20,089
2005 9,491 64,475 26,912 65,600 5,321 96,066 37,140 19,459
60Appendix 1.10 (continued)
Number of individuals in the private sector by occupational category
Year Male Female
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 17,294 73,492 142,082 849,520 3,880 50,291 158,477 332,049
1985 15,518 76,750 133,804 807,168 5,123 53,704 147,507 344,083
1986 13,855 80,820 138,264 885,241 4,714 61,711 162,239 369,858
1987 15,436 77,052 138,942 939,097 5,277 65,634 168,147 404,234
1988 20,007 84,116 150,307 1,006,275 7,528 73,256 180,199 437,957
1989 23,080 101,254 157,578 1,029,448 10,029 87,503 195,773 468,469
1990 26,670 106,188 164,418 1,110,217 11,972 89,467 211,883 505,189
1991 23,561 107,551 165,070 1,053,659 11,074 93,984 222,667 525,005
1992 27,792 115,525 175,118 1,113,086 14,643 101,585 231,126 566,448
1993 27,014 113,388 176,775 1,147,134 17,637 105,887 241,000 602,069
1994 31,457 131,924 205,779 1,271,779 20,976 121,436 282,831 640,651
1995 24,088 130,182 201,072 1,226,510 19,209 123,652 287,828 662,248
1996 25,554 134,620 202,954 1,177,948 23,525 125,810 275,959 637,862
1997 28,254 147,683 200,531 1,056,309 23,721 139,656 274,932 586,517
1998 34,134 160,184 195,049 1,077,772 26,670 154,430 284,931 609,689
1999 32,270 133,241 181,733 998,726 28,387 144,318 266,035 573,653
2000 34,393 134,669 182,063 991,184 26,182 152,307 266,646 591,283
2001 35,130 122,948 169,944 866,955 24,787 134,706 249,457 564,847
2002 40,082 120,953 176,410 886,066 33,423 140,351 259,807 560,866
2003 45,437 125,423 181,334 884,507 36,400 141,448 247,592 571,826
2004 53,203 149,704 207,151 946,252 41,601 161,659 277,831 617,321




Year Public sector Private sector
Total Male Female Total Male Female
1984 162 169 152 99 103 92
1985 190 199 179 116 121 108
1986 228 237 214 140 146 128
1987 275 281 266 165 168 158
1988 351 367 329 206 212 194
1989 444 465 418 263 269 253
1990 553 573 527 338 349 317
1991 734 772 685 444 449 434
1992 945 946 943 560 574 537
1993 1,272 1,309 1,226 778 813 722
1994 1,723 1,834 1,587 999 1,021 964
1995 1,942 1,997 1,879 1,136 1,174 1,077
1996 2,465 2,536 2,383 1,371 1,405 1,317
1997 3,077 3,149 3,000 1,666 1,720 1,583
1998 3,916 4,052 3,775 2,005 2,051 1,936
1999 4,376 4,500 4,240 2,172 2,176 2,167
2000 4,900 4,976 4,823 2,343 2,358 2,322
2001 5,382 5,237 5,531 2,285 2,270 2,304
2002 5,724 5,619 5,829 2,448 2,376 2,548
2003 6,042 6,040 6,045 2,536 2,506 2,576
2004 6,170 6,202 6,139 2,820 2,815 2,826
2005 6,701 6,621 6,786 3,031 3,013 3,056
Notes: The average wages reported in this appendix are calculated using data from
household surveys.
62Appendix 2.2 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector
(Current pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 160 158 167 163 157 155 153
1985 187 190 199 190 186 174 183
1986 214 218 250 214 221 207 221
1987 259 251 300 279 264 244 272
1988 344 310 386 350 339 308 343
1989 426 410 495 442 419 432 411
1990 536 508 603 556 557 505 547
1991 698 655 833 711 764 648 689
1992 849 1,016 1,020 965 938 866 850
1993 1,186 1,188 1,362 1,421 1,293 1,128 1,219
1994 1,551 1,613 1,995 1,645 1,788 1,445 1,490
1995 1,990 1,911 2,142 2,022 1,725 1,778 1,899
1996 2,593 2,409 2,702 2,216 2,376 2,322 2,504
1997 3,133 3,002 3,895 2,714 3,022 2,846 2,972
1998 4,108 3,800 4,403 3,738 3,991 3,680 3,767
1999 4,223 4,249 5,171 4,240 4,275 4,140 4,365
2000 4,803 5,280 5,009 4,480 4,908 4,959 4,817
2001 5,420 5,246 6,034 5,080 5,584 5,271 5,128
2002 5,488 5,531 6,537 5,488 5,533 5,277 6,082
2003 6,307 5,756 6,609 5,607 6,287 5,424 6,338
2004 6,382 5,479 6,699 6,758 6,252 5,797 6,148
2005 6,894 5,456 7,724 7,025 6,788 6,202 6,747
63Appendix 2.3 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector
(Current pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 87 100 108 102 94 88 62
1985 98 120 129 116 116 96 77
1986 120 143 161 141 131 113 87
1987 143 150 187 182 154 142 114
1988 178 182 236 217 199 183 140
1989 230 243 308 281 246 225 173
1990 296 313 400 351 323 278 221
1991 375 406 540 483 413 364 270
1992 472 525 664 607 531 474 352
1993 615 702 956 871 730 590 499
1994 812 1,004 1,218 999 897 785 635
1995 939 1,067 1,395 1,218 1,039 873 711
1996 1,207 1,362 1,677 1,308 1,360 1,213 1,018
1997 1,448 1,626 2,479 1,640 1,641 1,423 1,182
1998 1,730 2,006 2,823 1,959 1,959 1,754 1,418
1999 1,817 2,179 2,813 2,321 2,051 2,080 1,587
2000 2,057 2,372 3,135 2,261 2,420 2,085 1,679
2001 1,994 2,437 2,857 2,384 2,364 2,066 1,705
2002 2,061 2,498 3,312 2,639 2,433 2,060 1,975
2003 2,148 2,498 3,089 2,596 2,841 2,336 2,000
2004 2,363 2,684 3,625 2,920 3,034 2,533 2,128
2005 2,661 3,059 3,897 3,146 3,063 2,611 2,255
64Appendix 2.4 (continued)
Male average wage per-hour in the public sector
(Current pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 173 165 175 170 160 158 162
1985 210 200 209 195 188 177 191
1986 227 233 264 217 227 217 229
1987 265 259 306 274 270 247 295
1988 373 326 401 363 346 327 364
1989 442 439 516 467 430 449 442
1990 565 548 616 583 560 507 581
1991 729 719 866 777 800 653 733
1992 868 897 1,044 985 970 859 869
1993 1,239 1,260 1,410 1,459 1,269 1,115 1,316
1994 1,636 1,557 2,195 1,660 1,948 1,509 1,631
1995 2,149 1,991 2,145 2,053 1,734 1,779 2,030
1996 2,589 2,393 2,802 2,231 2,431 2,369 2,750
1997 3,271 3,155 3,999 2,666 3,046 2,852 3,146
1998 4,336 3,897 4,494 3,724 4,158 3,869 3,944
1999 4,092 4,420 5,543 4,097 4,214 4,366 4,612
2000 4,742 5,234 4,839 4,420 5,175 5,119 5,105
2001 5,216 5,326 5,681 4,657 5,332 5,133 5,189
2002 5,368 5,564 6,242 4,825 5,559 5,223 6,119
2003 6,169 5,517 6,476 5,482 6,499 5,375 6,593
2004 6,288 5,508 6,738 6,410 6,330 5,926 6,232
2005 6,569 5,662 7,354 6,375 7,048 5,966 7,024
65Appendix 2.5 (continued)
Male average wage per-hour in the private sector
(Current pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 91 105 113 106 97 86 63
1985 101 126 135 115 122 96 78
1986 127 153 170 145 137 116 87
1987 145 155 194 184 159 142 111
1988 187 189 248 222 205 182 138
1989 234 257 313 291 251 223 173
1990 304 322 423 368 332 277 220
1991 384 417 550 486 425 357 267
1992 499 547 681 634 545 466 352
1993 641 724 1,037 913 758 583 486
1994 831 1,055 1,256 1,026 916 768 629
1995 970 1,093 1,490 1,281 1,068 863 697
1996 1,243 1,402 1,753 1,344 1,390 1,220 1,030
1997 1,505 1,702 2,726 1,673 1,687 1,427 1,178
1998 1,775 2,068 3,015 2,041 2,022 1,735 1,364
1999 1,793 2,221 2,883 2,313 2,073 2,076 1,553
2000 2,129 2,393 3,328 2,242 2,365 2,111 1,584
2001 1,990 2,401 2,901 2,418 2,412 2,046 1,611
2002 2,102 2,506 3,106 2,614 2,394 2,015 1,848
2003 2,117 2,499 3,121 2,602 2,842 2,299 1,879
2004 2,368 2,703 3,711 2,880 3,077 2,565 2,008
2005 2,679 3,049 3,939 3,128 3,097 2,532 2,141
66Appendix 2.6 (continued)
Female average wage per-hour in the public sector
(Current pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 144 145 157 150 153 151 141
1985 161 175 185 182 184 171 172
1986 196 195 232 208 213 194 209
1987 251 237 291 287 255 240 238
1988 308 287 366 329 329 284 311
1989 407 370 470 404 406 413 366
1990 501 446 585 518 554 503 502
1991 657 561 794 632 719 642 628
1992 828 1,187 994 941 902 875 825
1993 1,123 1,083 1,312 1,367 1,322 1,142 1,086
1994 1,453 1,680 1,762 1,626 1,588 1,373 1,297
1995 1,801 1,817 2,138 1,982 1,715 1,777 1,749
1996 2,596 2,430 2,585 2,195 2,314 2,278 2,208
1997 3,004 2,837 3,806 2,778 2,994 2,839 2,774
1998 3,890 3,699 4,313 3,756 3,828 3,503 3,542
1999 4,379 4,054 4,761 4,402 4,345 3,924 4,072
2000 4,871 5,324 5,170 4,549 4,662 4,820 4,472
2001 5,596 5,170 6,404 5,534 5,829 5,411 5,053
2002 5,587 5,501 6,806 6,142 5,506 5,335 6,043
2003 6,423 6,013 6,767 5,745 6,054 5,475 6,034
2004 6,477 5,454 6,664 7,116 6,176 5,670 6,052
2005 7,237 5,244 8,090 7,839 6,512 6,429 6,421
67Appendix 2.7 (continued)
Female average wage per-hour in the private sector
(Current pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 79 87 100 93 88 94 58
1985 92 107 117 116 102 95 75
1986 108 121 146 133 118 108 89
1987 140 139 174 178 145 140 121
1988 164 165 217 208 187 186 146
1989 222 215 299 262 236 229 173
1990 282 295 363 320 307 281 224
1991 359 384 524 478 393 379 276
1992 433 480 641 562 507 492 354
1993 578 659 844 801 683 602 523
1994 780 901 1,166 955 865 822 646
1995 889 1,019 1,271 1,123 991 891 736
1996 1,152 1,290 1,575 1,252 1,312 1,201 999
1997 1,368 1,505 2,165 1,590 1,569 1,416 1,188
1998 1,666 1,906 2,581 1,843 1,870 1,789 1,512
1999 1,849 2,112 2,726 2,331 2,022 2,088 1,648
2000 1,969 2,339 2,896 2,286 2,491 2,046 1,822
2001 1,999 2,493 2,806 2,338 2,309 2,097 1,857
2002 2,008 2,484 3,544 2,672 2,483 2,134 2,173
2003 2,186 2,497 3,051 2,588 2,840 2,392 2,193
2004 2,355 2,654 3,528 2,973 2,981 2,488 2,310
2005 2,639 3,076 3,848 3,170 3,021 2,724 2,423
68Appendix 2.8 (continued)
Average wage per-hour by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Public sector Private sector
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 374 242 139 98 425 239 105 80
1985 426 273 160 122 433 276 120 95
1986 466 327 197 147 507 330 143 116
1987 695 407 233 173 681 386 170 137
1988 828 524 297 213 852 489 207 170
1989 992 657 367 269 1,029 617 258 216
1990 1,197 819 453 337 1,300 747 331 278
1991 1,674 1,088 591 440 1,751 977 438 364
1992 2,069 1,406 740 563 2,228 1,278 550 453
1993 2,653 1,883 1,030 743 3,259 2,014 720 608
1994 3,531 2,501 1,359 994 3,685 2,435 959 781
1995 3,826 2,777 1,526 1,151 3,950 2,694 1,137 901
1996 4,637 3,445 1,872 1,449 5,013 3,254 1,319 1,084
1997 5,585 4,310 2,298 1,785 5,272 4,115 1,583 1,294
1998 7,925 5,381 2,934 2,079 7,807 4,770 1,916 1,505
1999 8,870 6,199 3,217 2,265 7,118 4,978 2,110 1,653
2000 9,519 6,784 3,538 2,562 8,333 6,038 2,231 1,679
2001 9,446 7,385 4,136 2,710 7,801 5,547 2,179 1,667
2002 9,422 7,725 4,225 2,927 8,535 5,746 2,435 1,771
2003 10,489 7,875 4,536 3,134 8,629 5,703 2,389 1,847
2004 10,913 7,979 4,673 3,270 9,030 6,663 2,633 2,021
2005 11,627 8,476 5,076 3,627 9,231 6,843 2,770 2,226
69Appendix 2.9 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Male Female
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 400 284 147 102 321 200 132 88
1985 444 316 169 127 371 234 151 108
1986 488 381 211 151 386 277 183 136
1987 731 465 238 179 465 356 228 156
1988 891 612 318 222 619 443 277 189
1989 1,038 750 390 285 833 574 347 233
1990 1,275 923 467 357 1,029 719 440 292
1991 1,705 1,258 608 471 1,573 933 574 368
1992 2,059 1,511 763 597 2,090 1,317 723 486
1993 2,793 2,139 1,059 796 2,205 1,675 1,006 617
1994 3,345 3,026 1,564 1,028 3,896 2,066 1,193 906
1995 3,899 3,196 1,631 1,184 3,668 2,451 1,453 1,070
1996 4,842 3,889 1,945 1,489 4,103 3,086 1,820 1,352
1997 5,992 4,758 2,516 1,848 4,800 3,974 2,140 1,651
1998 9,094 6,126 2,969 2,095 5,603 4,804 2,912 2,045
1999 10,261 6,944 3,531 2,290 6,415 5,597 2,992 2,208
2000 10,214 7,510 3,798 2,585 7,846 6,265 3,378 2,510
2001 10,002 7,936 4,328 2,695 8,560 6,993 4,016 2,749
2002 8,618 8,492 4,338 2,919 10,507 7,176 4,155 2,945
2003 10,645 8,726 4,934 3,140 10,166 7,259 4,269 3,116
2004 12,146 8,934 5,037 3,258 8,928 7,350 4,438 3,303
2005 12,396 9,248 5,312 3,689 10,211 7,958 4,904 3,423
70Appendix 2.10 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Male Female
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 440 275 107 84 360 187 103 71
1985 480 320 121 99 294 213 119 86
1986 549 401 146 121 371 236 141 104
1987 725 458 172 141 550 303 169 128
1988 941 587 205 176 605 383 208 155
1989 1,109 710 261 221 837 511 256 202
1990 1,429 870 331 289 1,010 602 331 252
1991 1,898 1,137 427 370 1,442 800 446 353
1992 2,390 1,458 551 469 1,905 1,077 549 420
1993 3,651 2,568 702 634 2,642 1,442 733 556
1994 4,034 2,795 944 812 3,136 2,047 969 715
1995 4,295 3,196 1,165 941 3,472 2,157 1,118 823
1996 5,813 3,823 1,340 1,117 3,906 2,665 1,304 1,020
1997 5,834 4,840 1,563 1,360 4,549 3,345 1,599 1,160
1998 8,736 5,565 1,968 1,558 6,559 3,980 1,879 1,401
1999 7,904 5,636 2,121 1,699 6,226 4,375 2,102 1,565
2000 8,909 7,432 2,252 1,706 7,571 4,896 2,216 1,633
2001 8,795 6,118 2,086 1,697 6,549 5,023 2,246 1,616
2002 9,731 6,158 2,211 1,794 7,159 5,384 2,599 1,731
2003 9,786 6,487 2,256 1,861 7,288 5,040 2,488 1,822
2004 10,093 7,692 2,489 2,052 7,653 5,792 2,741 1,970
2005 10,233 7,711 2,617 2,249 8,130 6,041 2,883 2,189
71Appendix 2.11 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Managerial
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 184 474 440 371 479 271 335
1985 379 355 544 379 362 250 287
1986 438 710 519 470 405 390 398
1987 514 629 813 698 643 521 470
1988 717 1,075 835 1,214 732 746 786
1989 881 1,340 1,115 934 683 929 888
1990 1,109 1,084 1,415 1,316 1,121 1,110 872
1991 1,451 1,831 1,987 2,186 1,254 1,418 1,453
1992 2,203 1,513 2,344 2,061 2,196 1,791 1,532
1993 1,874 1,648 2,839 2,784 6,021 1,815 2,038
1994 2,705 2,664 5,400 2,772 3,001 3,004 2,371
1995 3,776 5,609 4,221 4,946 2,998 3,515 3,270
1996 4,771 3,523 4,910 3,981 4,747 5,681 4,208
1997 5,269 4,375 7,508 5,443 5,549 6,503 4,865
1998 6,005 10,913 8,815 9,019 7,522 13,965 6,788
1999 6,459 6,876 14,706 9,116 8,799 7,883 7,620
2000 7,909 29,167 11,368 8,404 8,131 20,041 7,153
2001 8,088 10,783 13,918 8,296 8,045 8,382 9,057
2002 7,739 8,529 14,655 11,919 7,731 8,969 9,193
2003 11,158 8,384 15,952 9,019 10,353 9,352 9,728
2004 12,211 8,010 18,187 12,489 11,488 7,910 10,811
2005 9,702 10,559 17,884 11,502 11,839 9,582 10,922
72Appendix 2.12 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Managerial
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 292 637 447 463 393 317 243
1985 337 268 477 425 437 355 358
1986 323 942 550 514 468 360 400
1987 571 663 745 866 520 634 382
1988 632 1,150 856 958 888 977 585
1989 715 948 1,181 990 964 1,168 695
1990 1,231 1,315 1,421 1,203 1,258 1,359 725
1991 1,424 2,061 2,028 1,676 1,506 2,187 810
1992 1,539 2,542 2,512 1,951 2,154 1,889 1,575
1993 1,661 2,867 3,651 4,141 3,367 2,375 1,926
1994 1,992 2,863 5,336 2,567 3,412 3,524 2,236
1995 2,142 3,627 5,732 4,148 3,111 3,760 2,553
1996 3,092 1,900 5,812 4,726 5,921 6,348 3,742
1997 4,001 2,562 7,253 5,841 4,437 7,417 3,444
1998 4,692 3,709 11,415 7,119 6,788 8,400 6,769
1999 4,129 5,371 10,302 7,020 5,898 8,012 5,485
2000 5,170 7,778 11,235 8,214 8,553 6,529 6,258
2001 5,067 7,025 11,908 7,831 6,906 8,987 7,088
2002 5,929 6,644 13,791 8,505 8,218 7,823 6,841
2003 5,660 7,041 12,233 8,380 9,349 8,662 7,266
2004 6,064 6,603 13,144 9,053 9,502 9,254 6,021
2005 6,916 7,080 14,331 10,015 8,702 7,693 6,086
73Appendix 2.13 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Professional
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 232 247 252 261 224 223 228
1985 246 258 298 289 264 247 260
1986 290 338 359 343 309 287 308
1987 363 383 445 436 384 373 405
1988 475 445 575 548 516 481 507
1989 599 629 738 686 612 638 592
1990 757 773 916 870 803 740 770
1991 981 984 1,312 1,091 1,094 939 954
1992 1,237 1,903 1,485 1,433 1,382 1,228 1,154
1993 1,657 1,721 2,083 2,735 1,800 1,763 1,626
1994 2,156 2,355 2,790 2,658 2,718 2,199 2,056
1995 2,841 2,680 3,179 2,937 2,475 2,642 2,526
1996 3,416 3,238 4,075 3,759 3,312 3,336 3,159
1997 4,353 3,849 5,395 4,372 4,398 4,353 3,866
1998 5,871 4,802 6,458 5,748 5,589 5,114 4,727
1999 6,189 5,783 7,606 6,585 6,064 6,023 5,691
2000 6,399 6,888 7,333 7,149 6,954 6,929 6,260
2001 7,669 6,836 8,562 7,407 8,063 7,617 6,409
2002 8,226 7,113 8,785 7,791 8,065 7,533 7,273
2003 8,081 7,376 8,885 8,399 8,360 7,200 7,574
2004 8,287 6,666 9,367 9,043 8,020 8,285 7,051
2005 9,135 6,572 10,042 9,169 8,363 8,542 8,009
74Appendix 2.14 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Professional
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 172 219 252 236 241 222 206
1985 226 238 293 282 287 276 210
1986 250 313 347 321 363 297 206
1987 301 316 421 422 360 390 346
1988 373 362 564 513 473 456 325
1989 489 490 702 635 603 509 459
1990 648 559 876 768 772 678 552
1991 800 730 1,186 994 959 894 615
1992 1,051 1,005 1,494 1,244 1,311 1,234 869
1993 1,383 1,460 2,817 1,846 1,725 1,704 1,064
1994 1,879 2,165 3,017 2,132 2,232 1,959 1,474
1995 2,193 2,033 3,207 2,967 2,576 2,400 1,657
1996 2,862 2,510 3,875 3,006 3,497 3,323 2,763
1997 3,519 3,158 5,469 4,313 4,393 3,670 2,877
1998 4,383 3,895 6,207 4,616 4,711 4,512 3,590
1999 4,168 4,208 6,005 5,456 4,859 5,317 3,712
2000 6,393 5,034 8,138 4,864 6,277 4,810 5,033
2001 5,177 5,113 6,816 5,164 6,054 5,169 4,391
2002 4,560 4,737 7,852 6,142 5,683 5,043 4,925
2003 4,944 4,593 6,967 5,848 6,787 4,875 4,899
2004 5,687 4,766 8,999 6,935 7,304 5,400 5,314
2005 6,171 5,406 8,367 7,304 7,327 6,016 5,861
75Appendix 2.15 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year O¢ ce
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 126 144 147 131 129 143 119
1985 149 174 168 151 151 165 140
1986 189 197 208 196 193 175 181
1987 216 210 252 252 226 215 204
1988 291 277 326 312 277 265 253
1989 342 352 390 397 367 363 308
1990 457 454 477 456 451 430 409
1991 549 594 657 608 575 527 520
1992 669 719 799 782 796 715 621
1993 987 1,030 1,047 1,088 1,194 951 830
1994 1,226 1,318 1,679 1,274 1,296 1,121 1,006
1995 1,453 1,572 1,764 1,611 1,430 1,426 1,134
1996 1,988 2,274 1,909 1,715 1,936 1,637 1,635
1997 2,223 2,661 2,599 2,238 2,412 2,075 2,000
1998 3,026 3,551 2,748 2,784 2,914 2,895 2,675
1999 2,789 3,845 3,382 3,170 3,204 3,376 2,733
2000 3,503 4,119 3,292 3,277 3,545 3,964 3,019
2001 3,940 4,451 4,099 4,282 4,127 4,536 3,458
2002 3,592 4,029 5,584 4,020 3,931 4,179 3,778
2003 4,773 3,967 5,231 4,039 4,350 4,671 4,111
2004 4,782 4,598 4,796 4,950 4,575 4,499 4,762
2005 4,819 4,431 6,307 5,535 4,826 4,555 4,978
76Appendix 2.16 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year O¢ ce
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 90 111 112 102 97 93 75
1985 101 122 132 112 118 102 86
1986 124 142 159 139 136 132 109
1987 144 157 187 180 164 155 139
1988 181 188 224 216 200 215 164
1989 219 253 283 266 249 263 193
1990 287 319 369 324 330 305 250
1991 383 422 503 438 415 394 319
1992 472 529 619 545 538 500 437
1993 625 680 806 761 702 673 537
1994 853 968 1,088 939 882 846 664
1995 882 1,070 1,397 1,084 1,060 937 779
1996 1,136 1,514 1,500 1,250 1,290 1,172 983
1997 1,395 1,708 1,955 1,525 1,616 1,406 1,189
1998 1,714 2,221 2,202 1,795 1,907 1,736 1,409
1999 1,764 2,259 2,560 2,087 2,099 1,975 1,644
2000 1,938 2,729 2,503 2,017 2,179 2,173 1,717
2001 1,974 2,325 2,429 2,161 2,157 2,211 1,787
2002 2,093 2,390 3,284 2,430 2,292 2,169 1,951
2003 2,163 2,190 2,860 2,387 2,480 2,362 2,013
2004 2,336 2,466 3,188 2,688 2,731 2,364 2,193
2005 2,496 2,673 3,386 2,795 2,758 2,491 2,207
77Appendix 2.17 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Other
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 106 106 97 101 99 88 88
1985 129 144 118 127 127 97 103
1986 145 143 157 143 155 121 128
1987 170 191 174 183 171 155 150
1988 227 223 213 223 216 178 194
1989 261 277 269 276 283 258 247
1990 341 356 333 347 346 298 314
1991 450 463 436 435 474 384 388
1992 598 570 567 600 551 495 536
1993 774 783 739 815 699 639 738
1994 1,037 1,020 1,007 1,037 1,009 925 848
1995 1,235 1,179 1,177 1,241 1,114 976 1,073
1996 1,613 1,556 1,468 1,329 1,474 1,342 1,308
1997 1,796 2,082 2,129 1,731 1,743 1,610 1,535
1998 2,197 2,333 2,099 1,986 2,115 1,862 2,026
1999 2,313 2,257 2,465 2,161 2,337 2,111 2,264
2000 3,031 2,497 2,443 2,431 2,777 2,492 2,354
2001 2,662 2,642 2,551 2,755 2,809 2,894 2,583
2002 2,989 2,760 2,827 3,276 3,077 2,758 2,930
2003 3,241 2,896 3,056 3,358 3,252 3,026 3,170
2004 3,646 3,163 2,919 3,853 3,371 2,962 3,355
2005 3,785 3,202 3,791 3,858 3,961 3,292 3,345
78Appendix 2.18 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(Current pesos)
Year Other
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 76 84 82 83 81 73 51
1985 82 105 99 94 101 76 65
1986 104 117 128 119 115 92 75
1987 125 128 146 152 138 115 94
1988 154 161 180 180 175 155 116
1989 202 209 232 231 216 188 142
1990 256 273 313 290 275 233 179
1991 333 347 418 401 351 303 233
1992 422 440 493 508 451 392 291
1993 543 567 668 703 609 479 390
1994 705 803 875 839 736 645 489
1995 826 908 1,030 971 864 688 568
1996 1,013 1,111 1,257 1,074 1,104 942 735
1997 1,181 1,329 1,790 1,248 1,341 1,114 891
1998 1,399 1,546 1,857 1,559 1,546 1,386 1,060
1999 1,500 1,735 1,944 1,739 1,644 1,589 1,248
2000 1,501 1,743 1,957 1,711 1,789 1,672 1,220
2001 1,540 1,821 1,804 1,824 1,800 1,590 1,217
2002 1,710 1,935 1,963 1,910 1,834 1,600 1,416
2003 1,728 1,946 1,964 1,971 1,977 1,791 1,454
2004 1,885 2,152 2,180 2,095 2,151 1,974 1,560




Year Public sector Private sector
Total Male Female Total Male Female
1984 5,195 5,413 4,878 3,187 3,300 2,955
1985 4,927 5,146 4,634 3,009 3,122 2,787
1986 4,956 5,167 4,655 3,039 3,170 2,782
1987 4,850 4,962 4,690 2,906 2,970 2,782
1988 4,839 5,062 4,532 2,836 2,921 2,676
1989 4,862 5,088 4,572 2,880 2,940 2,773
1990 4,690 4,859 4,467 2,863 2,959 2,689
1991 4,772 5,021 4,450 2,884 2,920 2,823
1992 4,835 4,841 4,829 2,866 2,936 2,750
1993 5,316 5,474 5,124 3,251 3,398 3,017
1994 5,862 6,242 5,399 3,399 3,473 3,280
1995 5,466 5,620 5,289 3,197 3,303 3,032
1996 5,744 5,910 5,553 3,194 3,274 3,069
1997 6,051 6,193 5,901 3,276 3,382 3,113
1998 6,490 6,716 6,256 3,322 3,398 3,208
1999 6,541 6,726 6,337 3,247 3,252 3,239
2000 6,706 6,809 6,601 3,206 3,227 3,177
2001 6,822 6,638 7,011 2,896 2,878 2,920
2002 6,823 6,696 6,947 2,917 2,832 3,036
2003 6,722 6,720 6,725 2,821 2,788 2,866
2004 6,482 6,515 6,449 2,962 2,958 2,968
2005 6,701 6,621 6,786 3,031 3,013 3,056
Notes: The average real wages reported in this appendix are calculated using the data
from Appendix 1, de￿ ated using the consumer price index 2005=100.
80Appendix 3.2 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector
(2005 Pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 5,144 5,064 5,364 5,222 5,050 4,967 4,909
1985 4,846 4,907 5,140 4,921 4,819 4,501 4,743
1986 4,650 4,751 5,444 4,647 4,820 4,504 4,806
1987 4,576 4,435 5,291 4,918 4,653 4,311 4,803
1988 4,736 4,275 5,324 4,824 4,667 4,247 4,720
1989 4,660 4,484 5,422 4,833 4,591 4,730 4,504
1990 4,547 4,303 5,109 4,716 4,725 4,283 4,633
1991 4,536 4,260 5,418 4,624 4,966 4,211 4,477
1992 4,346 5,202 5,223 4,940 4,803 4,432 4,351
1993 4,957 4,966 5,692 5,940 5,404 4,716 5,097
1994 5,277 5,488 6,789 5,598 6,085 4,918 5,070
1995 5,601 5,378 6,028 5,690 4,855 5,005 5,346
1996 6,041 5,614 6,295 5,164 5,537 5,411 5,835
1997 6,162 5,904 7,660 5,339 5,944 5,597 5,845
1998 6,808 6,297 7,296 6,196 6,614 6,099 6,243
1999 6,312 6,351 7,730 6,338 6,390 6,188 6,524
2000 6,573 7,226 6,855 6,131 6,717 6,787 6,592
2001 6,870 6,649 7,648 6,438 7,078 6,682 6,499
2002 6,541 6,592 7,791 6,541 6,595 6,290 7,249
2003 7,016 6,403 7,353 6,238 6,994 6,034 7,051
2004 6,705 5,755 7,037 7,099 6,568 6,089 6,459
2005 6,894 5,456 7,724 7,025 6,788 6,202 6,747
81Appendix 3.3 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector
(2005 Pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 2,782 3,196 3,470 3,276 3,012 2,825 1,984
1985 2,526 3,107 3,330 2,990 2,990 2,474 1,995
1986 2,611 3,115 3,498 3,072 2,849 2,470 1,902
1987 2,531 2,655 3,296 3,211 2,718 2,501 2,008
1988 2,455 2,504 3,251 2,995 2,742 2,518 1,930
1989 2,513 2,658 3,372 3,073 2,689 2,464 1,893
1990 2,509 2,656 3,386 2,974 2,737 2,356 1,872
1991 2,435 2,643 3,508 3,142 2,686 2,368 1,758
1992 2,417 2,689 3,400 3,105 2,717 2,428 1,804
1993 2,571 2,936 3,997 3,641 3,050 2,467 2,086
1994 2,761 3,415 4,146 3,400 3,052 2,673 2,162
1995 2,643 3,004 3,925 3,429 2,923 2,456 2,001
1996 2,811 3,173 3,907 3,048 3,168 2,827 2,372
1997 2,848 3,199 4,876 3,226 3,227 2,799 2,324
1998 2,867 3,324 4,679 3,247 3,247 2,907 2,350
1999 2,716 3,257 4,205 3,469 3,066 3,110 2,372
2000 2,815 3,247 4,290 3,094 3,312 2,853 2,298
2001 2,527 3,089 3,621 3,021 2,996 2,619 2,161
2002 2,456 2,977 3,948 3,145 2,900 2,455 2,354
2003 2,390 2,779 3,436 2,888 3,160 2,599 2,225
2004 2,482 2,820 3,808 3,067 3,187 2,661 2,236
2005 2,661 3,059 3,897 3,146 3,063 2,611 2,255
82Appendix 3.4 (continued)
Male average wage per-hour in the public sector
(2005 Pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 5,536 5,297 5,607 5,456 5,139 5,070 5,184
1985 5,440 5,173 5,410 5,050 4,852 4,569 4,950
1986 4,943 5,069 5,740 4,723 4,941 4,718 4,979
1987 4,686 4,572 5,406 4,831 4,768 4,367 5,210
1988 5,134 4,492 5,520 5,008 4,772 4,507 5,015
1989 4,837 4,806 5,654 5,108 4,708 4,918 4,836
1990 4,792 4,645 5,223 4,943 4,748 4,299 4,924
1991 4,738 4,672 5,627 5,050 5,202 4,243 4,764
1992 4,442 4,589 5,346 5,044 4,966 4,395 4,446
1993 5,179 5,267 5,893 6,101 5,304 4,663 5,501
1994 5,568 5,299 7,470 5,648 6,629 5,133 5,550
1995 6,049 5,605 6,037 5,778 4,880 5,008 5,714
1996 6,033 5,576 6,529 5,197 5,663 5,519 6,407
1997 6,433 6,204 7,864 5,244 5,991 5,609 6,188
1998 7,186 6,458 7,448 6,171 6,891 6,412 6,536
1999 6,116 6,607 8,286 6,123 6,298 6,526 6,893
2000 6,489 7,163 6,622 6,049 7,083 7,006 6,986
2001 6,612 6,751 7,201 5,903 6,759 6,507 6,578
2002 6,398 6,631 7,440 5,750 6,625 6,224 7,293
2003 6,863 6,138 7,204 6,098 7,231 5,980 7,335
2004 6,605 5,787 7,078 6,734 6,649 6,225 6,547
2005 6,569 5,662 7,354 6,375 7,048 5,966 7,024
83Appendix 3.5 (continued)
Male average wage per-hour in the private sector
(2005 Pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 2,909 3,365 3,619 3,411 3,101 2,749 2,034
1985 2,621 3,250 3,503 2,984 3,160 2,479 2,015
1986 2,754 3,325 3,691 3,161 2,978 2,529 1,891
1987 2,565 2,739 3,429 3,248 2,798 2,511 1,953
1988 2,572 2,604 3,410 3,062 2,823 2,501 1,897
1989 2,564 2,812 3,432 3,180 2,746 2,445 1,892
1990 2,580 2,729 3,581 3,117 2,813 2,346 1,861
1991 2,496 2,712 3,578 3,163 2,765 2,321 1,739
1992 2,553 2,802 3,483 3,243 2,789 2,386 1,800
1993 2,679 3,027 4,336 3,818 3,168 2,439 2,030
1994 2,829 3,589 4,275 3,492 3,116 2,612 2,142
1995 2,730 3,077 4,194 3,605 3,005 2,429 1,962
1996 2,897 3,267 4,085 3,132 3,239 2,842 2,400
1997 2,961 3,347 5,362 3,291 3,317 2,806 2,317
1998 2,941 3,426 4,997 3,382 3,350 2,875 2,261
1999 2,679 3,319 4,309 3,457 3,098 3,102 2,321
2000 2,913 3,275 4,554 3,069 3,236 2,890 2,168
2001 2,523 3,043 3,678 3,064 3,057 2,594 2,042
2002 2,505 2,987 3,702 3,116 2,853 2,401 2,202
2003 2,355 2,780 3,473 2,894 3,161 2,558 2,090
2004 2,488 2,840 3,898 3,026 3,232 2,695 2,109
2005 2,679 3,049 3,939 3,128 3,097 2,532 2,141
84Appendix 3.6 (continued)
Female average wage per-hour in the public sector
(2005 Pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 4,619 4,652 5,023 4,823 4,924 4,838 4,515
1985 4,164 4,540 4,783 4,718 4,771 4,421 4,457
1986 4,265 4,239 5,054 4,518 4,646 4,219 4,546
1987 4,434 4,188 5,133 5,059 4,503 4,234 4,203
1988 4,244 3,953 5,043 4,535 4,536 3,914 4,287
1989 4,457 4,052 5,139 4,423 4,441 4,523 4,002
1990 4,247 3,777 4,961 4,389 4,697 4,262 4,252
1991 4,271 3,647 5,164 4,109 4,675 4,172 4,080
1992 4,240 6,073 5,086 4,814 4,616 4,478 4,223
1993 4,696 4,526 5,483 5,716 5,525 4,773 4,541
1994 4,944 5,718 5,996 5,532 5,405 4,671 4,414
1995 5,070 5,113 6,017 5,578 4,828 5,002 4,923
1996 6,048 5,662 6,024 5,115 5,391 5,307 5,146
1997 5,907 5,580 7,485 5,464 5,888 5,584 5,456
1998 6,447 6,130 7,148 6,224 6,344 5,805 5,870
1999 6,545 6,060 7,117 6,580 6,494 5,865 6,087
2000 6,666 7,286 7,075 6,225 6,380 6,597 6,121
2001 7,093 6,553 8,117 7,015 7,388 6,859 6,405
2002 6,659 6,556 8,111 7,321 6,562 6,359 7,203
2003 7,146 6,690 7,528 6,391 6,735 6,091 6,713
2004 6,804 5,729 7,000 7,475 6,487 5,957 6,358
2005 7,237 5,244 8,090 7,839 6,512 6,429 6,421
85Appendix 3.7 (continued)
Female average wage per-hour in the private sector
(2005 Pesos)
Year City
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 2,540 2,784 3,200 2,985 2,815 3,015 1,852
1985 2,380 2,781 3,026 3,004 2,633 2,462 1,942
1986 2,350 2,628 3,172 2,898 2,570 2,344 1,928
1987 2,472 2,461 3,076 3,140 2,554 2,477 2,134
1988 2,255 2,274 2,994 2,866 2,583 2,563 2,005
1989 2,434 2,353 3,278 2,863 2,582 2,506 1,896
1990 2,390 2,503 3,074 2,712 2,599 2,380 1,896
1991 2,333 2,499 3,408 3,106 2,555 2,465 1,795
1992 2,216 2,456 3,282 2,876 2,594 2,518 1,813
1993 2,415 2,756 3,527 3,350 2,857 2,517 2,186
1994 2,654 3,064 3,967 3,249 2,944 2,798 2,199
1995 2,501 2,869 3,576 3,160 2,790 2,508 2,072
1996 2,685 3,006 3,669 2,916 3,057 2,797 2,329
1997 2,690 2,959 4,258 3,127 3,086 2,785 2,336
1998 2,762 3,159 4,278 3,055 3,099 2,965 2,506
1999 2,763 3,157 4,075 3,485 3,022 3,122 2,463
2000 2,695 3,202 3,963 3,129 3,409 2,800 2,493
2001 2,533 3,160 3,557 2,963 2,926 2,658 2,353
2002 2,393 2,960 4,224 3,184 2,959 2,544 2,590
2003 2,432 2,778 3,394 2,879 3,159 2,661 2,440
2004 2,474 2,788 3,706 3,123 3,132 2,613 2,426
2005 2,639 3,076 3,848 3,170 3,021 2,724 2,423
86Appendix 3.8 (continued)
Average wage per-hour by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Public sector Private sector
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 11,994 7,756 4,472 3,153 13,645 7,666 3,361 2,577
1985 11,010 7,067 4,135 3,155 11,203 7,138 3,097 2,461
1986 10,139 7,122 4,281 3,198 11,029 7,174 3,119 2,520
1987 12,263 7,190 4,116 3,048 12,023 6,813 3,008 2,421
1988 11,410 7,221 4,091 2,939 11,740 6,733 2,850 2,342
1989 10,857 7,196 4,014 2,949 11,258 6,749 2,825 2,360
1990 10,145 6,938 3,842 2,857 11,020 6,331 2,807 2,358
1991 10,880 7,073 3,839 2,860 11,382 6,352 2,846 2,369
1992 10,591 7,196 3,790 2,884 11,403 6,541 2,813 2,319
1993 11,091 7,871 4,307 3,106 13,621 8,420 3,008 2,542
1994 12,015 8,511 4,623 3,383 12,540 8,285 3,262 2,657
1995 10,768 7,815 4,295 3,240 11,118 7,582 3,201 2,537
1996 10,805 8,028 4,361 3,377 11,680 7,582 3,074 2,526
1997 10,984 8,477 4,519 3,511 10,368 8,094 3,114 2,544
1998 13,134 8,919 4,863 3,446 12,938 7,905 3,176 2,494
1999 13,259 9,265 4,809 3,386 10,640 7,441 3,154 2,471
2000 13,027 9,284 4,842 3,506 11,403 8,264 3,053 2,298
2001 11,974 9,360 5,242 3,436 9,888 7,031 2,762 2,114
2002 11,229 9,207 5,035 3,488 10,172 6,848 2,902 2,111
2003 11,669 8,761 5,047 3,487 9,600 6,344 2,657 2,054
2004 11,464 8,382 4,909 3,435 9,486 6,999 2,766 2,123
2005 11,627 8,476 5,076 3,627 9,231 6,843 2,770 2,226
87Appendix 3.9 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Male Female
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 12,829 9,111 4,706 3,270 10,316 6,430 4,227 2,818
1985 11,497 8,184 4,373 3,288 9,596 6,049 3,914 2,793
1986 10,623 8,292 4,591 3,282 8,399 6,023 3,978 2,953
1987 12,910 8,199 4,207 3,152 8,204 6,284 4,026 2,747
1988 12,271 8,437 4,385 3,060 8,533 6,105 3,816 2,602
1989 11,365 8,211 4,267 3,117 9,118 6,278 3,797 2,547
1990 10,808 7,822 3,958 3,022 8,718 6,093 3,730 2,474
1991 11,087 8,177 3,955 3,065 10,228 6,065 3,734 2,392
1992 10,537 7,732 3,905 3,055 10,699 6,739 3,699 2,485
1993 11,674 8,942 4,427 3,329 9,218 7,003 4,204 2,579
1994 11,381 10,297 5,323 3,499 13,258 7,029 4,060 3,084
1995 10,973 8,996 4,591 3,332 10,325 6,898 4,090 3,011
1996 11,281 9,063 4,531 3,470 9,560 7,190 4,241 3,151
1997 11,784 9,358 4,948 3,635 9,440 7,816 4,208 3,246
1998 15,071 10,152 4,920 3,472 9,285 7,962 4,826 3,388
1999 15,338 10,380 5,278 3,423 9,589 8,366 4,472 3,300
2000 13,978 10,278 5,197 3,537 10,737 8,574 4,623 3,435
2001 12,678 10,059 5,486 3,416 10,850 8,864 5,090 3,485
2002 10,272 10,122 5,171 3,479 12,522 8,553 4,952 3,510
2003 11,843 9,708 5,489 3,493 11,310 8,076 4,749 3,467
2004 12,760 9,385 5,291 3,422 9,379 7,721 4,662 3,470
2005 12,396 9,248 5,312 3,689 10,211 7,958 4,904 3,423
88Appendix 3.10 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Male Female
Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other Managerial Professional O¢ ce Other
1984 14,114 8,822 3,419 2,685 11,558 5,990 3,308 2,291
1985 12,429 8,280 3,128 2,559 7,616 5,517 3,070 2,222
1986 11,938 8,723 3,172 2,625 8,075 5,141 3,072 2,256
1987 12,793 8,079 3,028 2,489 9,701 5,356 2,991 2,256
1988 12,971 8,085 2,826 2,430 8,338 5,270 2,870 2,131
1989 12,134 7,771 2,855 2,424 9,159 5,595 2,801 2,214
1990 12,109 7,378 2,806 2,453 8,560 5,105 2,808 2,136
1991 12,341 7,390 2,774 2,405 9,373 5,202 2,900 2,293
1992 12,230 7,460 2,820 2,400 9,750 5,512 2,808 2,149
1993 15,261 10,733 2,933 2,649 11,042 6,028 3,063 2,326
1994 13,725 9,510 3,213 2,765 10,672 6,965 3,299 2,433
1995 12,088 8,995 3,278 2,649 9,771 6,071 3,146 2,315
1996 13,545 8,908 3,123 2,602 9,102 6,210 3,038 2,376
1997 11,474 9,519 3,074 2,676 8,946 6,579 3,145 2,282
1998 14,477 9,223 3,262 2,583 10,870 6,595 3,114 2,322
1999 11,815 8,425 3,170 2,540 9,307 6,539 3,142 2,339
2000 12,192 10,171 3,082 2,334 10,361 6,701 3,033 2,234
2001 11,148 7,755 2,644 2,151 8,301 6,367 2,847 2,049
2002 11,597 7,340 2,635 2,138 8,532 6,416 3,097 2,064
2003 10,887 7,217 2,510 2,070 8,108 5,608 2,768 2,027
2004 10,603 8,080 2,614 2,155 8,040 6,084 2,879 2,070
2005 10,233 7,711 2,617 2,249 8,130 6,041 2,883 2,189
89Appendix 3.11 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Managerial
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 5,902 15,214 14,115 11,901 15,382 8,712 10,757
1985 9,805 9,186 14,068 9,816 9,370 6,464 7,421
1986 9,532 15,445 11,299 10,236 8,824 8,485 8,665
1987 9,080 11,099 14,354 12,315 11,351 9,192 8,288
1988 9,875 14,812 11,510 16,724 10,083 10,273 10,826
1989 9,647 14,672 12,202 10,225 7,474 10,173 9,724
1990 9,403 9,184 11,993 11,155 9,504 9,411 7,394
1991 9,435 11,903 12,917 14,212 8,151 9,220 9,449
1992 11,273 7,745 11,995 10,550 11,237 9,165 7,843
1993 7,832 6,891 11,868 11,637 25,170 7,585 8,520
1994 9,205 9,066 18,375 9,433 10,213 10,222 8,067
1995 10,629 15,787 11,880 13,920 8,437 9,893 9,203
1996 11,116 8,209 11,441 9,276 11,061 13,236 9,805
1997 10,362 8,605 14,767 10,704 10,913 12,790 9,569
1998 9,952 18,086 14,610 14,947 12,466 23,144 11,250
1999 9,654 10,278 21,982 13,626 13,153 11,783 11,389
2000 10,823 39,915 15,558 11,502 11,128 27,427 9,789
2001 10,252 13,668 17,641 10,516 10,198 10,624 11,481
2002 9,224 10,165 17,466 14,205 9,214 10,690 10,956
2003 12,414 9,327 17,746 10,034 11,518 10,404 10,823
2004 12,827 8,414 19,105 13,119 12,068 8,309 11,357
2005 9,702 10,559 17,884 11,502 11,839 9,582 10,922
90Appendix 3.12 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Managerial
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 9,361 20,427 14,328 14,870 12,597 10,182 7,803
1985 8,709 6,935 12,329 11,003 11,315 9,175 9,272
1986 7,026 20,498 11,973 11,186 10,188 7,830 8,705
1987 10,085 11,702 13,143 15,287 9,171 11,191 6,735
1988 8,707 15,850 11,795 13,199 12,229 13,456 8,054
1989 7,829 10,372 12,925 10,839 10,549 12,787 7,604
1990 10,434 11,147 12,040 10,195 10,666 11,520 6,146
1991 9,259 13,399 13,186 10,894 9,793 14,220 5,268
1992 7,878 13,010 12,857 9,984 11,027 9,668 8,061
1993 6,941 11,986 15,263 17,310 14,073 9,929 8,051
1994 6,778 9,741 18,155 8,733 11,611 11,991 7,607
1995 6,028 10,209 16,134 11,676 8,755 10,583 7,186
1996 7,204 4,426 13,542 11,012 13,797 14,792 8,718
1997 7,868 5,038 14,265 11,488 8,727 14,588 6,773
1998 7,776 6,147 18,917 11,798 11,249 13,921 11,219
1999 6,171 8,029 15,399 10,492 8,816 11,976 8,199
2000 7,076 10,644 15,375 11,241 11,704 8,935 8,565
2001 6,423 8,904 15,094 9,927 8,754 11,391 8,984
2002 7,066 7,918 16,436 10,137 9,795 9,323 8,154
2003 6,297 7,833 13,609 9,323 10,401 9,636 8,084
2004 6,370 6,936 13,808 9,510 9,982 9,721 6,325
2005 6,916 7,080 14,331 10,015 8,702 7,693 6,086
91Appendix 3.13 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Professional
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 7,439 7,929 8,077 8,383 7,202 7,157 7,307
1985 6,362 6,673 7,705 7,483 6,820 6,395 6,730
1986 6,315 7,353 7,815 7,465 6,724 6,243 6,696
1987 6,400 6,754 7,846 7,691 6,778 6,584 7,140
1988 6,545 6,125 7,929 7,545 7,104 6,624 6,980
1989 6,561 6,889 8,073 7,514 6,695 6,988 6,482
1990 6,413 6,549 7,766 7,371 6,809 6,272 6,525
1991 6,377 6,400 8,528 7,093 7,112 6,102 6,199
1992 6,333 9,740 7,601 7,333 7,074 6,284 5,904
1993 6,925 7,195 8,708 11,432 7,522 7,371 6,795
1994 7,337 8,013 9,492 9,044 9,248 7,483 6,994
1995 7,996 7,544 8,949 8,267 6,967 7,436 7,109
1996 7,960 7,544 9,495 8,759 7,716 7,773 7,361
1997 8,562 7,570 10,610 8,599 8,650 8,561 7,603
1998 9,730 7,958 10,703 9,525 9,263 8,475 7,834
1999 9,251 8,644 11,368 9,843 9,063 9,003 8,507
2000 8,758 9,426 10,035 9,783 9,517 9,482 8,568
2001 9,720 8,665 10,853 9,389 10,220 9,655 8,124
2002 9,804 8,478 10,470 9,286 9,612 8,978 8,668
2003 8,990 8,206 9,884 9,343 9,301 8,010 8,427
2004 8,705 7,003 9,840 9,499 8,425 8,703 7,406
2005 9,135 6,572 10,042 9,169 8,363 8,542 8,009
92Appendix 3.14 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Professional
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 5,505 7,037 8,071 7,586 7,729 7,121 6,601
1985 5,852 6,155 7,588 7,305 7,425 7,133 5,442
1986 5,448 6,820 7,548 6,988 7,898 6,462 4,491
1987 5,316 5,579 7,437 7,446 6,359 6,877 6,104
1988 5,143 4,987 7,775 7,074 6,514 6,288 4,474
1989 5,355 5,362 7,684 6,950 6,602 5,574 5,025
1990 5,489 4,737 7,422 6,511 6,547 5,749 4,681
1991 5,199 4,747 7,711 6,462 6,236 5,810 3,997
1992 5,377 5,143 7,646 6,368 6,708 6,316 4,447
1993 5,780 6,101 11,775 7,717 7,211 7,124 4,449
1994 6,392 7,365 10,266 7,256 7,596 6,666 5,016
1995 6,172 5,721 9,028 8,350 7,252 6,755 4,665
1996 6,668 5,849 9,029 7,004 8,147 7,742 6,438
1997 6,921 6,211 10,756 8,483 8,640 7,218 5,659
1998 7,263 6,454 10,286 7,650 7,808 7,477 5,950
1999 6,231 6,290 8,977 8,156 7,263 7,948 5,548
2000 8,749 6,889 11,136 6,656 8,590 6,583 6,887
2001 6,562 6,480 8,639 6,546 7,673 6,552 5,566
2002 5,435 5,646 9,359 7,320 6,773 6,010 5,870
2003 5,500 5,109 7,751 6,506 7,550 5,423 5,450
2004 5,974 5,007 9,453 7,285 7,673 5,673 5,583
2005 6,171 5,406 8,367 7,304 7,327 6,016 5,861
93Appendix 3.15 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year O¢ ce
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 4,054 4,606 4,719 4,190 4,153 4,599 3,804
1985 3,858 4,508 4,337 3,901 3,913 4,260 3,614
1986 4,103 4,284 4,526 4,274 4,189 3,811 3,934
1987 3,817 3,704 4,440 4,453 3,996 3,804 3,595
1988 4,006 3,819 4,489 4,294 3,814 3,649 3,487
1989 3,749 3,852 4,265 4,347 4,014 3,977 3,370
1990 3,875 3,844 4,044 3,864 3,820 3,641 3,466
1991 3,566 3,863 4,269 3,954 3,740 3,426 3,378
1992 3,424 3,681 4,091 4,003 4,073 3,658 3,180
1993 4,124 4,307 4,376 4,547 4,990 3,976 3,469
1994 4,172 4,483 5,712 4,335 4,410 3,814 3,422
1995 4,089 4,424 4,966 4,533 4,024 4,013 3,193
1996 4,631 5,298 4,448 3,997 4,510 3,815 3,810
1997 4,372 5,233 5,111 4,402 4,745 4,081 3,933
1998 5,015 5,884 4,554 4,615 4,830 4,797 4,433
1999 4,169 5,747 5,056 4,738 4,789 5,046 4,085
2000 4,794 5,637 4,505 4,485 4,852 5,425 4,131
2001 4,994 5,642 5,196 5,428 5,231 5,749 4,383
2002 4,281 4,802 6,656 4,792 4,686 4,980 4,502
2003 5,310 4,413 5,819 4,493 4,839 5,196 4,574
2004 5,024 4,830 5,038 5,199 4,806 4,726 5,003
2005 4,819 4,431 6,307 5,535 4,826 4,555 4,978
94Appendix 3.16 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year O¢ ce
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 2,898 3,555 3,582 3,275 3,101 2,979 2,393
1985 2,622 3,153 3,402 2,905 3,057 2,638 2,224
1986 2,704 3,087 3,463 3,022 2,958 2,877 2,373
1987 2,541 2,776 3,297 3,184 2,900 2,731 2,445
1988 2,499 2,588 3,083 2,977 2,756 2,959 2,254
1989 2,397 2,764 3,099 2,913 2,722 2,875 2,111
1990 2,430 2,703 3,128 2,743 2,801 2,586 2,117
1991 2,487 2,743 3,269 2,845 2,699 2,559 2,074
1992 2,417 2,708 3,166 2,787 2,753 2,559 2,238
1993 2,613 2,842 3,368 3,183 2,935 2,814 2,246
1994 2,901 3,292 3,702 3,195 3,001 2,878 2,260
1995 2,481 3,013 3,933 3,050 2,984 2,639 2,191
1996 2,648 3,528 3,495 2,913 3,006 2,732 2,290
1997 2,743 3,359 3,844 2,999 3,179 2,765 2,339
1998 2,840 3,682 3,650 2,974 3,161 2,877 2,335
1999 2,637 3,377 3,827 3,119 3,137 2,952 2,457
2000 2,653 3,734 3,425 2,760 2,982 2,973 2,350
2001 2,502 2,947 3,079 2,739 2,734 2,802 2,264
2002 2,495 2,849 3,914 2,896 2,731 2,585 2,326
2003 2,406 2,437 3,181 2,656 2,759 2,628 2,240
2004 2,454 2,591 3,349 2,824 2,869 2,483 2,304
2005 2,496 2,673 3,386 2,795 2,758 2,491 2,207
95Appendix 3.17 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the public sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Other
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 3,400 3,415 3,116 3,243 3,173 2,825 2,837
1985 3,344 3,736 3,063 3,279 3,276 2,517 2,657
1986 3,151 3,118 3,416 3,103 3,379 2,629 2,788
1987 2,994 3,378 3,065 3,238 3,010 2,737 2,656
1988 3,134 3,067 2,936 3,078 2,982 2,458 2,675
1989 2,858 3,027 2,942 3,024 3,097 2,825 2,698
1990 2,893 3,017 2,822 2,945 2,936 2,525 2,665
1991 2,928 3,010 2,833 2,831 3,083 2,499 2,523
1992 3,058 2,920 2,904 3,072 2,820 2,534 2,743
1993 3,237 3,274 3,087 3,405 2,921 2,672 3,083
1994 3,529 3,470 3,428 3,528 3,432 3,147 2,885
1995 3,477 3,317 3,314 3,492 3,135 2,746 3,019
1996 3,758 3,627 3,420 3,097 3,434 3,128 3,048
1997 3,532 4,095 4,187 3,405 3,429 3,166 3,019
1998 3,641 3,866 3,478 3,291 3,505 3,086 3,357
1999 3,458 3,374 3,685 3,230 3,494 3,156 3,383
2000 4,147 3,418 3,344 3,327 3,801 3,410 3,222
2001 3,374 3,348 3,233 3,492 3,561 3,668 3,274
2002 3,562 3,290 3,370 3,905 3,668 3,287 3,492
2003 3,606 3,222 3,400 3,735 3,618 3,367 3,527
2004 3,831 3,323 3,067 4,048 3,541 3,112 3,525
2005 3,785 3,202 3,791 3,858 3,961 3,292 3,345
96Appendix 3.18 (continued)
Average wage per-hour in the private sector by occupational category
(2005 Pesos)
Year Other
Bucaramanga Barranquilla BogotÆ Cali Medell￿n Manizales Pasto
1984 2,454 2,705 2,645 2,667 2,589 2,350 1,648
1985 2,132 2,722 2,566 2,442 2,602 1,965 1,671
1986 2,269 2,548 2,779 2,588 2,501 1,994 1,626
1987 2,209 2,264 2,574 2,685 2,434 2,037 1,664
1988 2,120 2,225 2,477 2,476 2,406 2,131 1,594
1989 2,214 2,286 2,539 2,523 2,363 2,055 1,559
1990 2,168 2,311 2,650 2,461 2,333 1,974 1,516
1991 2,168 2,257 2,715 2,607 2,285 1,967 1,513
1992 2,160 2,250 2,522 2,602 2,308 2,007 1,490
1993 2,270 2,369 2,791 2,938 2,545 2,004 1,628
1994 2,399 2,733 2,978 2,857 2,506 2,196 1,663
1995 2,325 2,556 2,899 2,734 2,432 1,937 1,598
1996 2,360 2,588 2,930 2,501 2,573 2,195 1,713
1997 2,322 2,614 3,520 2,455 2,638 2,191 1,752
1998 2,319 2,562 3,078 2,583 2,562 2,297 1,757
1999 2,243 2,593 2,906 2,600 2,457 2,375 1,866
2000 2,054 2,386 2,678 2,342 2,449 2,289 1,669
2001 1,952 2,308 2,286 2,313 2,281 2,016 1,542
2002 2,038 2,307 2,340 2,276 2,186 1,907 1,688
2003 1,923 2,165 2,185 2,193 2,199 1,993 1,618
2004 1,981 2,261 2,290 2,201 2,259 2,074 1,639
2005 2,077 2,362 2,465 2,368 2,330 2,034 1,706
97